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ABSTRACT
This dissertation consists of three essays on monetary economics. The first two essays
have a focus on the zero lower bound on the nominal interest rate (ZLB) and the Great
Recession. In the first essay, I investigate optimal discretionary monetary policy under
the ZLB in the case of a distorted steady state due to monopoly and taxation. I find that
the central bank in a more distorted economy would cut the interest rate less aggressively
under a particular adverse demand shock. This occurs because the ZLB is less likely to
bind and the economy escapes from the ZLB sooner. In addition, I show that the conven-
tional linear-quadratic method is not accurate when the ZLB binds.
In the second essay, I model the role of subprime lending, deleveraging and an incom-
plete financial market in driving an economy to the liquidity trap with binding ZLB. There
are two key features that differentiate my work from the current literature of deleveraging
and the ZLB. First, I endogenize the debt limit of borrowing-constrained households by
tying it to the market value of collateral assets. Second and more importantly, I allow for
subprime lending. I am able to show that the second feature drives the economy to the
ZLB more likely under an adverse shock to the credit market. When the ZLB binds, a
great recession emerges with a free fall in output and the price level, mostly due to the
Fisherian debt deflation that puts more debt burden on the borrowers.
v
The third essay examines the role of habit formation in solving the persistence prob-
lem - output response is transient and not hump-shaped under a monetary shock - in the
conventional state dependent pricing model. Intuitively, incorporating habit formation
makes consumers less aggressive in spending under a shock, resulting in more persistent
response of output. With a moderate habit formation, I am able to show that the model
produces hump-shaped and very persistent response of output under a monetary growth
shock.
vi
Contents
1 Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a Micro-Founded Model with
a Zero Lower Bound on Nominal Interest Rate 1
1.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.2.1 Household . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.2.2 Final goods producer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.3 Intermediate goods producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.2.4 Aggregate conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.2.5 Overall economic distortion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.3 Optimal discretionary policy problem under the ZLB . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.4 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.1 Parameter calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.4.2 Steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
1.4.3 Optimal output, inflation, and interest rate policy . . . . . . . . . 20
1.4.4 What is the optimal inflation rate? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
1.4.5 Sensitivity analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
1.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
1.6 Appendices: Chapter 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6.1 Discretionary optimal policy under ZLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
1.6.2 Solution method . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
vii
1.6.3 "Analytical" Jacobian matrix, fX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
1.6.4 Simplified LQ model of the FNL model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
1.6.5 Solving the LQ model with zero lower bound . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2 Subprime Lending, Deleveraging and a Great Recession 58
2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
2.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2.1 Borrowing-constrained household's problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
2.2.2 Unconstrained household's problem . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
2.2.3 Final goods producer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2.4 Intermediate goods producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
2.2.5 Aggregate conditions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
2.2.6 Government policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.2.7 Equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
2.3 Results: a two-period deleveraging model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.3.1 Calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 70
2.3.2 Without the ZLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
2.3.3 With ZLB . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 77
2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
2.5 Appendices: Chapter 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.5.1 Equilibrium equations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82
2.5.2 Steady state . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
3 Habit Formation in State-Dependent Pricing Models Implications for
the Dynamics of Output and Prices 86
3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
viii
3.2 Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2.1 Households . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.2.2 Final goods producer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
3.2.3 Intermediate goods producers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
3.2.4 Optimal pricing adjustment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
3.2.5 Money demand and supply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
3.2.6 General equilibrium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101
3.3 Steady state of the economy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.3.1 Steady state characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
3.3.2 Parameter calibration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
3.3.3 Steady state results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
3.4 Dynamics of output and inflation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.4.1 Methodology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.4.2 Dynamics results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113
3.5 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
Bibliography 119
Curriculum Vitae 127
ix
List of Tables
1.1 Benchmark parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
2.1 Benchmark parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.1 Benchmark parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107
x
List of Figures
1.1 Inflation and current relative price dispersion. Note that preference is at
the steady state (βSS=β) and overall economic distortion (Φ) is 0.20. . . . 18
1.2 Steady state inflation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
1.3 Optimal policy in the economy with a non-distorted steady state (Φ = 0).
Gross initial relative price dispersion is at the steady state (∆t−1 = ∆SS = 1). 21
1.4 Optimal policy in the economy with a non-distorted steady state (Φ = 0),
with different values of initial relative price dispersion, in the FNL model. 24
1.5 Optimal policy in the economy with a distorted steady state (Φ = 0.20).
Note that the initial relative price dispersion at the deterministic steady
state (∆t−1 = ∆SS = 1.0029, or 1.2% per year). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
1.6 Optimal policy in the economy with a distorted steady state (Φ = 0.2),
with different values of initial relative price dispersion, in the FNL model. 29
1.7 Average welfare relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. The
probability of hitting the ZLB is around 6% in the non-distorted case. . . 31
1.8 Welfare relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. The probability
of hitting the ZLB is around 6% in the non-distorted case. . . . . . . . . . 33
1.9 Average welfare relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. The
probability of hitting the ZLB is 9.5% in the non-distorted case. . . . . . . 34
1.10 Welfare relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. The probability
of hitting the ZLB is 9.5% in the non-distorted case. . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
xi
2.1 Responses of macro economic variables, the case without the ZLB. . . . . 73
2.2 Responses of macro economic variables, the case without the ZLB. (cont.) 74
2.3 Responses of macro economic variables, the case of prime lending and with-
out the ZLB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.4 Responses of macro economic variables, the case of prime lending and with-
out the ZLB. (cont.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
2.5 Responses of macro economic variables, the case with subprime lending and
the ZLB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
2.6 Responses of macro economic variables, the case with subprime lending and
the ZLB. (cont.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
2.7 Responses of macro economic variables, the case with subprime lending and
the ZLB. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
2.8 Responses of macro economic variables, the case with subprime lending and
the ZLB. (cont.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80
3.1 Probability of adjusting prices in each vintage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.2 Beginning-period distribution of firms (θ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
3.3 Profit functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
3.4 Value function when pi = 2.5% . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
3.5 Impulse responses under a permanent shock to the money supply . . . . . 114
3.6 Output responses under a permanent shock to the money supply . . . . . 114
3.7 Impulse responses under a persistent shock to the money supply . . . . . . 116
3.8 Output responses under a persistent shock to the money supply . . . . . . 116
3.9 Impulse responses under a permanent shock to the money growth . . . . . 117
xii
3.10 Output responses under a permanent shock to the money growth . . . . . 118
xiii
List of Abbreviations
AR Autoregressive
CES Constant Elasticity of Substitution
CPI Consumer Price Index
DKW Dotsey, King and Wolman, as in Dotsey et al. [1999]
DSGE Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium
EK Eggertsson and Krugman, as in Eggertsson and Krugman [2012]
FRB Federal Reserve Bank
FNL Fully Nonlinear
GDP Gross Domestic Product
LQ Linear - Quadratic
PPI Producer Price Index
SDP State Dependent Pricing
TDP Time Dependent Pricing
VAR Vector Autoregression
ZLB Zero Lower Bound (on the Nominal Interest Rate)
xiv
1Chapter 1
Optimal Discretionary Monetary Policy in a
Micro-Founded Model with a Zero Lower Bound on
Nominal Interest Rate
1.1 Introduction
An extensive literature of optimal monetary policy under the ZLB utilizes the conventional
LQ approach developed in Woodford [2001, 2003]. The key assumption of this approach is
that the overall economic distortion due to monopoly and taxation is zero. In other words,
there exists an employment subsidy to fully offset monopolistic distortion so that the
steady state output is not distorted from its socially efficient level. Under this assumption,
we can simplify a fully nonlinear micro-founded problem of optimal discretionary monetary
policy using the LQ approach and can avoid computational difficulty.
However, in the LQ framework, relative price dispersion is eliminated by the first order
approximation and is no longer an endogenous state variable. Alvarez et al. [2011] find
that relative price variance is significantly positive when inflation is high. Zandweghe
and Wolman [2010] shows that if initial relative price dispersion is large, the monetary
authority will choose higher nominal interest rates. Hence, it is interesting to study the
impact of relative price dispersion in particular and full nonlinearity in general on optimal
discretionary monetary policy under the ZLB.
More importantly, the assumption of zero overall economic distortion, or non-distorted
2steady state output, is questionable in reality. McGrattan [1994] reports that labor income
taxes range from 10 − 40%, while Diewert and Fox [2008] estimate that monopolistic
markups in some main industries range from 11− 44%. As a result, the overall economic
distortion ranges from 20−60%. It is well-known in the literature of inflation bias that, the
greater the overall economic distortion, the higher the average inflation under discretion,
and, as a result, the higher the nominal interest rate. This helps a central bank to create
leeway to deal with big demand shocks that would push the economy into a liquidity trap
with binding ZLB. This information might influence private expectations, which, in turn,
might affect optimal policy before, during and after the ZLB period.
This paper aims at filling the hole in the ZLB literature by investigating optimal
discretionary monetary policy under the ZLB in the case of a distorted steady state due
to positive overall economic distortion. Unlike the existing literature, including Adam and
Billi [2007], I solve a FNL micro-founded model using a global method. Also, I use the LQ
method to simplify the FNL model, which I solve using the same method. Then I provide
a comparison between the FNL and LQ models.
I obtain four sets of main findings. First, under a particular shock driving the economy
near the ZLB, the central bank in an economy with a larger economic distortion would
cut the interest rate less aggressively. The intuition is that, in this economy, inflation and
interest rate are higher on average. Hence, for the ZLB is about to bind, it requires a
particular adverse demand shock to occur. Given the mean-reverting nature of shocks,
the conditional probability that another adverse shock occurs and pushes the economy
into the liquidity trap with binding ZLB is very small. Further, even when this shock
occurs and the ZLB binds, the output losses and reduction in inflation are smaller than
they would be in an economy with a smaller economic distortion. Therefore, downward
3pressure on the conditional expected inflation is smaller and the central bank cuts the
nominal interest rate less aggressively.
This finding generates new implications for optimal discretionary monetary policy
when the economy escapes from the liquidity trap. Given an overall economic distortion
that results in a deterministic steady state inflation of about 2.4% per year and given our
calibration of shocks that match the existing literature, we find that, when the economy
escapes from the ZLB, the central bank should not keep the nominal interest rate at zero
for an extended period of time.
Second, with a larger overall economic distortion, long run inflation and interest rates
are higher on average, resulting in smaller probability of reaching the ZLB. However, I
find that, if the social planner was allowed to choose the optimal inflation rate by setting
the income tax, he would choose the optimal inflation rate of approximately zero, corre-
sponding to very small overall economic distortion. This occurs because the unconditional
benefit from avoiding the ZLB is not big enough to offset the cost of higher relative price
dispersion when inflation is high. In sum, the unconditional expected welfare is maximal
when the average long run inflation is around zero.
Also, when overall economic distortion is large, I am able to show that inflation can
be moderately positive even at a time when the economy is pushed into the liquidity trap
with binding ZLB, which is consistent with what we observe in the U.S. after the 2007-
2009 recession. The reason is that expected inflation is high. Even if an adverse demand
shock occurs and pushes the economy into a liquidity trap with output losses and binding
ZLB, downward pressure on the price level is still not large enough to offset the expected
inflation. So actual inflation is positive even when the ZLB binds.
Third, when the initial relative price distortion is greater than the steady state value,
4the central bank tends to pursue higher nominal interest rate, making the ZLB less likely
to bind. The intuition is that the relative price dispersion is an inefficiency wedge, when
it is high the central bank would like to reduce it by tightening the monetary policy, and,
as a result, lowering the front-loading behavior by firms in setting their prices, leading to
a smaller current relative price dispersion. This result is interesting and can not be found
using the LQ method because the change in relative price dispersion is always zero by the
first order approximation.
Finally, the FNL model and the LQ model produce very different results if there is a
particular adverse shock that makes the ZLB binding, even though the overall economic
distortion is sufficiently small. The reason is that, when the ZLB binds, the central bank
can not stabilize output and the price level, making the relative price dispersion to stay
far away from the steady state. While the impact of the relative price dispersion as an
endogenous state variable in the true FNL model is significant, it has no role in the LQ
model due to the first order approximation. This result helps to answer the question raised
by Adam and Billi [2007] whether a fully nonlinear model might alter the policy function
stemming from their model that is based on the LQ approach.
When the overall economic distortion is large, the approximated inflation and interest
rate in the LQ model are substantially smaller than the true values, derived using the
FNL model. Specifically, according to the FNL model, the deterministic steady state
inflation and nominal interest rate increase at a rate that increases in the size of overall
economic distortion. However, the corresponding relationship in the LQ model is just
linear. Consequently, given the ZLB binds in both models, the output losses in the FNL
model are significantly smaller than those in the LQ model. In addition, the interest rate
cut in the FNL model is less aggressive when the ZLB is about to bind.
5The related literature on optimal monetary policy under the ZLB has been inspired
by seminal work by Krugman [1998], which extensively discusses causes and consequences
of the ZLB in a series of simple two-period perfect-foresight models. Since then, extensive
research related to the ZLB has been implemented, including Eggertsson and Woodford
[2003], Jung et al. [2005], Adam and Billi [2006], Nakov [2008], Levin et al. [2010], Bo-
denstein et al. [2010], Eggertsson and Krugman [2010], and Werning [2011]. The common
feature of these papers is that they utilize the LQ approach to simplify their original non-
linear rational expectations models. In contrast to this paper, they implicitly rely on the
assumption that taxes are designed to fully offset monopoly.
The papers closest to mine are Adam and Billi [2007], and Anderson et al. [2010].
Unlike the previous ZLB literature, Adam and Billi [2007] solve the optimal monetary
policy problem under discretion that explicitly allows for an occasionally-binding ZLB.
However, because they use the LQ approach, the only nonlinearity in their paper is the
ZLB. This paper extends Adam and Billi [2007] by considering a fully nonlinear model
instead of using the LQ approach. In addition, this paper studies the implications of
positive overall economic distortion on discretionary policy and optimal inflation rate in
the presence of the ZLB.
Anderson et al. [2010] investigate the size of inflationary bias under discretion in the
presence of overall economic distortion using nonlinear methods. However, in their model,
the nominal interest rate can be adjusted freely because the ZLB is not allowed. So the
average long-run inflation is the same as the deterministic steady state inflation. This
paper extends their work by considering the ZLB, a very important constraint faced by
policymakers. Moreover, this paper aims at modeling the interaction between private
expectations and optimal policy responses under the ZLB when large economic distortion
6exists.
There are three recent working papers studying the ZLB using fully nonlinear methods.
Nakata [2011] studies optimal fiscal and monetary policy in a nonlinear sticky price model
of the Rotemberg-type instead of the Calvo-type as in my model. I choose to use the Calvo-
type price adjustments so that I can examine relative price dispersion as an endogenous
variable and compare my results directly to the results in the previous literature. I study
the role of economic distortion in forming private expectations and optimal monetary
policy, while he focuses on fiscal policy. Fernandez-Villaverde et al. [2012] study the ZLB
in a fully nonlinear model using the collocation method associated with Smolyak nodes.
Judd et al. [2011] solve a fully nonlinear New Keynesian model with the ZLB using a
cluster-grid algorithm. The monetary policy in these two papers is a Taylor rule. They
do not consider optimal discretionary monetary policy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure
of the economy. Section 3 describes the discretionary monetary policy problem faced
by a central bank and explains briefly solution methods. In Section 4, we calibrate key
parameters and report main results. Section 5 concludes.
1.2 Model
The economic structure in this paper presents two key New Keynesian features, such
as in Rotemberg and Woodford [1997] and Yun [1996]. Particularly, intermediate goods
producers are monopolistic competitors. In addition, they are identical except their prices
due to infrequent price adjustments of the Calvo-type.
71.2.1 Household
The representative household maximizes his total expected discounted flow utilities:
maxEt

(
C1−γt
1− γ − χ
N1+ηt
1 + η
)
+
∞∑
j=1
{(
j−1∏
k=0
βt+k
)(
C1−γt+j
1− γ − χ
N1+ηt+j
1 + η
)}
subject to the budget constraint:
Ct +Bt = (1− τw)wtNt +Bt−1
(
1 + it−1
1 + pit
)
+
1∫
0
Dt(i)di+ Tt (1.1)
where C,N are composite consumption and total labor; B,D, T denote real bond, dividend
and lump sum transfer; i, pi are net nominal interest rate and inflation, respectively; w is
real wage; τw is labor income tax; γ, η, χ are risk aversion, inverse wage elasticity of labor,
and steady state labor determining parameters; β is the stochastic subjective discount
factor or preference shock that follows an AR(1) process with a steady state value β :
ln (βt+1) = (1− ρβ) ln
(
β
)
+ ρβ ln (βt) + εβ,t+1, where βt is given. (1.2)
The optimal choices of the household must satisfy the following conditions:
Et
[
βt
(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ ( 1 + it
1 + pit+1
)]
= 1 (1.3)
χNηt
C−γt
= (1− τw)wt (1.4)
The first condition shows the marginal inter-temporal trade-off between today's and
tomorrow's consumption. The second condition is the marginal trade-off between working
and consuming.
The stochastic preference is a reduced form of more realistic forces that can drive the
nominal interest rate to the ZLB. From the Euler equation, an increase in discount factor
8causes the nominal interest rate to fall given private expectations and households' desire
to smooth their consumption. The conventional technology shock is not able to cause the
ZLB to bind realistically. The reason is that we need a very big positive technology shock
to generate massive savings that can drive the nominal interest rate to the ZLB. We did
not observe this type of shock before the onset of the last crisis.
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni [2011] model debt limit and household heterogeneity in labor
productivity. They show that an exogenous decline in the debt limit acts as an increase
in the subjective discount factor in my representative agent model. The decline in the
debt limit causes future consumption to be more volatile because with lower debt limit
households will be less able to insure their consumption against risks. Therefore, the savers
will save more and the borrowers will borrow less due to precautionary savings.
Eggertsson and Krugman [2010] also model household debt limit and deleveraging as a
key factor to drive the nominal interest rate to the ZLB. In their model, an initial shock to
the debt limit causes borrowers to deleverage by cutting back their consumption, resulting
in a decrease in the price level. This deflation puts more pressure on the real debt the
borrowers have to pay back now, leading to further deleveraging and a sharper decline in
the nominal interest rate.
My second essay in the dissertation extends Eggertsson and Krugman [2010] by endo-
genizing the debt limit. He studies the interaction between the ZLB and the endogenous
debt limit in explaining the collapse of the housing market and the Great Recession. Hall
[2011] models excessive capital stock and a sharp decline in capital utilization as the reason
for the nominal interest rate to be pinned at the ZLB. Curdia and Woodford [2009] model
a shock to the wedge between deposit and lending rates as a driving force.
91.2.2 Final goods producer
The final goods producer operates in a perfectly competitive market. He produces the
composite consumption goods by aggregating variety of differentiated goods using a CES
technology. His problem is to maximize his contemporaneous profit.
maxPtYt −
∫ 1
0
Pt (i)Yt (i) di (1.5)
subject to
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt (i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
(1.6)
where yit is the input of intermediate goods i ∈ [0, 1] and ε is the elasticity of substitution
between differentiated goods.
The optimal decision of the final goods producer gives rise to the demand for the
intermediate goods i :
Yt (i) =
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−
Yt (1.7)
where Pt is the price index:
Pt =
(∫
Pt (i)
1− di
) 1
1−
(1.8)
1.2.3 Intermediate goods producers
There is a mass one of intermediate goods producers that are monopolistic competitors.
An intermediate goods firm's objective is to maximize its expected total discounted flow
of profits. Each period a firm keeps its previous price with probability θ and resets its
price with probability (1− θ). The firm's problem is given below:
maxEit
Dt (i) +
∞∑
j=1
{(
j−1∏
k=0
βt+k
)(
Ct+j
Ct
)−γ
Dt+j (i)
} (1.9)
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subject to
Dt+j (i) =
Pt+j (i)
Pt+j
Yt+j (i)− wt+jNt+j (i) (1.10)
Pt+j+1 (i) =

P ∗t+j+1 (i) with prob 1− θ
Pt+j (i) with prob θ
(1.11)
Yt (i) = Nt (i) (1.12)
Given its price Pt(i) and demand Yt(i), the firm i chooses labor that
max
{
Pt (i)
Pt
Yt (i)− wtNt (i)
}
(1.13)
subject to its demand in equation (2.20) and production function in equation (1.12) .
Let ϕt(i) be the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the demand. The first order
condition gives us the same marginal cost for all firms, ϕt:
ϕt = ϕt(i) = wt (1.14)
Whenever a firm has a chance to reset its price, it chooses the new price to solve:
Max
Pt(i)
Eit

[
Pt(i)
Pt
− ϕt
]
Yt(i) +
∞∑
j=1
{
θj
(
j−1∏
k=0
βt+k
)(
Ct+j
Ct
)−γ [Pt(i)
Pt+j
− ϕt+j
]
Yt+j(i)
}
(1.15)
subject to its demand in equation (2.20). The optimal relative price, P ∗t (i)/Pt, is the same
for all firms who are able to reset their prices today:
P ∗t (i)
Pt
= p∗t =
(
ε
ε−1
)
Et
C−γt Ytϕt +
∞∑
j=1
{
θj
(
j−1∏
k=0
βt+k
)
C−γt+j
(
Pt+j
Pt
)ε
Yt+jϕt+j
}
Et
C−γt Yt +
∞∑
j=1
{
θj
(
j−1∏
k=0
βt+k
)
C−γt+j
(
Pt+j
Pt
)ε−1
Yt+j
}
(1.16)
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Whenever firms have an opportunity to reset their prices, they take into account the
current and expected future demand, marginal cost, and price level, as well as preference.
If we define St and Ft as below,
St =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
Et
C−γt Ytϕt +
∞∑
j=1
{
θj
(
j−1∏
k=0
βt+k
)
C−γt+j
(
Pt+j
Pt
)ε
Yt+jϕt+j
}
Ft = Et
C−γt Yt +
∞∑
j=1
{
θj
(
j−1∏
k=0
βt+k
)
C−γt+j
(
Pt+j
Pt
)ε−1
Yt+j
}
then we can write St, Ft in recursive forms:
St =
(
ε
ε− 1
)
C−γt Ytϕt + θEt
[
βtΠ
ε
t+1St+1
]
(1.17)
Ft = C
−γ
t Yt + θEt
[
βtΠ
ε−1
t+1Ft+1
]
(1.18)
and we can rewrite the optimal relative pricing rule, p∗t = St/Ft, where Π = (1 + pi) is
gross inflation.
Combining (1.17) with (1.4) and (1.14), we obtain:
St =
χCtN
η
t
(1− Φ) + θEt
[
βtΠ
ε
t+1St+1
]
(1.19)
where
Φ = 1− (1− τw) ·
(
1− ε−1) (1.20)
and Φ is called overall economic distortion. I will discuss this metric in a section below.
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1.2.4 Aggregate conditions
Aggregate output satisfies:
Yt =
Nt
∆t
(1.21)
where ∆t is called the relative price dispersion and is defined as:
∆t =
∫ (
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ε
di (1.22)
or in a recursive form:
∆t = θΠ
ε
t∆t−1 + (1− θ) (p∗t )−ε (1.23)
I write the price level (2.21) in a recursive form and divide both sides by Pt to obtain
the optimal relative price:
p∗t =
(
1− θΠtε−1
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
(1.24)
Plugging this optimal relative price in the relative price dispersion equation (1.23) we
obtain:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
+ θΠεt∆t−1 (1.25)
1.2.5 Overall economic distortion
In this section, I discuss the overall economic distortion, which is defined as in equation
(1.20). To understand more about the meaning of this notation, let us consider an economy
with flexible price. In this economy, the marginal cost, ϕ, equals the inverse of markup (or(
1− ε−1)). From equation (1.4), (1.14), and (2.34) we compute the equilibrium flexible-
price output
(
Y ft
)
and the equilibrium efficient output (Y ∗t ) as follows:
Y ft = N
∗ · (1− Φ) 1η+γ (1.26)
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Y ∗t = N
∗ (1.27)
where N∗ is the long-run efficient output. The percentage deviation of the flexible-price
output from the efficient output equals:(
Y ft − Y ∗t
Y ∗t
)
· 100 ' − 1
η + γ
· Φ · 100
The larger the overall economic distortion, the smaller the flexible-price output relative
to the efficient output. It is important to note that while the overall economic distortion
is zero, it does not mean there is not any type of economic distortions. Instead, it means
that we can attain the efficient output level by designating labor income subsidy to fully
offset the monopoly power, given no price stickiness.
It is also important to emphasize that when the overall economic distortion is large
or the inverse labor elasticity and risk aversion are small, the flexible price output is
far below the efficient output level. Under discretion, the central bank tends to create
positive inflation to try to attain the efficient output. In equilibrium, the greater the
overall economic distortion, the smaller the flexible-price output relative to the efficient
output, the greater the inflation the central bank tends to create.
1.3 Optimal discretionary policy problem under the ZLB
The central bank takes the expectations of economic agents as given and maximizes the
representative household's discounted utility subject to the optimality conditions from
market participants, the aggregate conditions, the law of motion for the state variables,
and the explicit ZLB on the nominal interest rate. Under discretion, the economic agents
know that the central bank is going to re-optimize every period and they incorporate this
information in forming their expectations. As a result, unlike under commitment, under
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discretion the central bank does not have power in manipulating the private expectations.1
The problem can be stated in the form of a Bellman equation:
V (∆t−1, βt) = max{it,Ct,Nt,St,Ft,pit,∆t}
{
C1−γt
1− γ − χ
N1+ηt
1 + η
+ βtEtV (∆t, βt+1)
}
(1.28)
subject to
(i) Households' and firms' optimality conditions, and aggregate conditions.
(ii) Law of motion for state variables.
(iii) ZLB on the nominal interest rate (it ≥ 0).
(iv) No commitment to future policy that is made in the past.2
The solution of the above nonlinear system is called Markovian invariant policy func-
tion of the state, st = (∆t−1, βt) , where ∆t−1 is an endogenous state and βt is an exogenous
one. In the paper, I solve the above FNL model using a global method called collocation
method. First, I use equidistant collocation nodes to solve the model and find out policy
function, based on which I investigate potential kinks. Then I redistribute the nodes by
clustering them around these potential kinks and resolve the model. I employ the time-
iteration method. At each collocation node, I solve a complementarity problem using
the Newton method and semi-smooth root finding formulations as described in Miranda
and Fackler [2002]. I also provide an "analytical" Jacobian matrix computed from the
approximating functions.3 Moreover, I write my code using a parallel computing method
that allows us to split up a large number of collocation nodes into smaller groups that
then are assigned to different processors to solve simultaneously. All these computational
1The central bank can manipulate private expectations under commitment by pre-committing to the
path of current and future policies. However, the time-inconsistency issue arises and commitment is not
credible.
2See 1.6.1 for how to write down the problem in detail.
3See 1.6.3 for the "analytical" Jacobian matrix.
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characteristics help to significantly increase the rate of convergence and make the solution
method very reliable.4
I also use the LQ approach, as described in Woodford [2003], to simplify the FNL model
which I then solve using the same method.5 Specifically, according to the LQ approach,
the central bank's objective function is quadratically approximated and all the constraints
and law of motion are (log)linearly approximated around the steady state values associated
with zero inflation. The endogenous variables in the LQ framework are defined as below:
pit = log (1 + pit)− log(1) (1.29)
ît = log (1 + it)− log(1/β) (1.30)
xt =
(
log(Yt)− log(Y )
)− (log(Y ft )− log(Y f )) (1.31)
where β is the steady state discount factor; Y and Y
f
are the steady state sticky-price
and flexible-price outputs when the overall economic distortion presents; x is output gap.
First, we solve for the policy function in the LQ framework, including ît, pit,and xt. Then,
we back out the policy function for it, pit, Yt using equations (1.29) − (1.31), which I call
LQ results.
1.4 Results
1.4.1 Parameter calibration
I calibrate the steady state quarterly time discount factor, β, to be 0.993, corresponding
to a real nominal interest rate of 2.8% per year. The relative risk aversion (γ) is 4 , as
4See 1.6.2 for how we solve the model in detail, including the error reported from checking the solution.
5See 1.6.4 for the simplified LQ model. Note that (i) the LQ model with the ZLB is also a nonlinear
model and I have to use the global method to solve it; (ii) the LQ approach is actually not applicable
when the overall economic distortion, Φ, is large.
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in Nakov [2008], and the inverse elasticity of labor with respect to wage (η) is 1. The
monopoly power parameter (ε) is calibrated to be 10, corresponding to a 11% markup
that is in the range found by Diewert and Fox [2008]. The probability that a firm keeps
its price unchanged each quarter, θ, is chosen to be 0.75 so that firms keep their prices
for 4 quarters on average. This value is commonly used in the ZLB literature, such as
Anderson et al. [2010].
I calibrate the persistence of the preference shock to be 0.8 that is consistent with the
persistence of the natural rate of interest rate as in Adam and Billi [2007]. The hard part
is how to calibrate the variance of the preference shock. In the paper, I calibrate this
parameter to be 0.42% per quarter that enables the model to generate the unconditional
probability of hitting the ZLB of around 6%. This value is a little small compared with the
fact that we have been at the ZLB since December 2008 and that we are projected to be at
the bound until mid 2015. However this value is still the upper value of the range 5%−6%
found in the empirical studies before the last financial crisis, as in Fernandez-Villaverde
et al. [2012].
The overall economic distortion, Φ, is calibrated to be either 0 or 0.20. The first case
is the conventional assumption in the LQ method, corresponding to the case of a non-
distorted steady state. In the second case, both the markup and the labor income tax are
set to be 11%. These values are in the range found by Diewert and Fox [2008]. As I show
below, a higher value of Φ only makes the LQ model more inaccurate.
1.4.2 Steady state
The steady state values depend on the overall economic distortion (Φ). With a labor
income subsidy designed to fully offset the monopolistic distortion, the overall economic
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Table 1.1: Benchmark parameters
Symbol Description Values
β Quarterly discount factor 0.993
γ Constant relative risk aversion 4
η Inverse elasticity of labor with respect to real wage 1
ε Monopoly power 10
θ Probability that a firm keeps its price unchanged each quarter 0.75
σβ Standard deviation of preference preference shocks (percent) 0.4
ρβ AR-coefficient of preference shocks 0.8
Φ Overall economic distortion 0; 0.20
χ Parameter associated with the disutility of labor 1
distortion is zero. In this case, the steady state inflation and gross interest rate are 0 and
1/β respectively. However, in the case of positive overall economic distortion, it is difficult
to compute the steady state values.
Figure 1.1 shows optimal gross inflation and relative price dispersion as a function of
initial relative price dispersion, given the steady state preference of β. The steady state
relative price dispersion is the value that equals the initial relative price dispersion. In
this example, they are 1.0029 (or about 1.2% annually). Using this value, we compute the
steady state gross inflation to be 1.006 (or 2.4% per year). See Appendix for the formula
that can be used to compute the steady state inflation using the LQ method.
To illustrate the impact of nonlinearity and overall economic distortion, I compute the
deterministic steady state inflation and interest rate in both LQ and FNL models with
respect to different values of the overall economic distortion.6 The results are presented
in Figure 1.2 and are similar to Anderson et al. [2010].
Two interesting features in Figure 1.2 are worth being addressed. First, there is a
6Note that the monopolistic distortion is always 0.1. For each value of overall economic distortion
(Φ), we can compute a corresponding value of income tax using equation (1.20). For example, if Φ = 0,
τw = −11%; if Φ = 0.2, τω = 11%
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Figure 1.1: Inflation and current relative price dispersion. Note that preference is at the
steady state (βSS=β) and overall economic distortion (Φ) is 0.20.
positive relationship between the steady state inflation and the size of overall economic
distortion in both FNL and LQ models. Intuitively, the larger the size of the overall
distortion, the higher the marginal benefit of inflation because a higher inflation rate can
help to lower the real markup, stimulating output and employment. However, this does
not come at no cost. In fact, a higher inflation rate induces a firm to set a higher price
when it has a chance to do so because the firm knows that it may not be able to adjust its
price in the future and that a higher inflation rate will erode its relative price and profit.
This front-loading in setting price causes the dispersion in relative prices to increase and
lower the aggregate output, as in equation (2.34) .
Second and more importantly, Figure 1.2 shows that the steady state interest rate in
the true (FNL) model is a convex function with respect to the size of overall economic
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Figure 1.2: Steady state inflation.
distortion. However, the steady state interest rate in the LQ model are only the first order
approximation of the true value around Φ = 0. Due to the convexity of the true function,
the LQ model always underestimates the true steady state value.7 When the size of the
overall economic distortion increases, the underestimation increases at an increasing rate.
Surprisingly, it is not difficult to prove that, under commitment, the steady state
inflation rate in both LQ and FNL models is zero regardless of the size of overall economic
distortion.8 Therefore the steady state interest rate is always equal to minus the steady
state real interest rate, which is 2.8% annually.
With inflation and interest rates being smaller than the true ones, the ZLB is more
7While the degree of convexity depends negatively on the curvature of the labor supply (η) and the
risk aversion parameter (γ), it is positively related to the price stickiness.
8See Schmitt-Grohe and Uribe [2010] for the proof.
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likely to be reached in the LQ model. Therefore, given preference shocks that cause the
ZLB to bind in both models, the LQ method generates more sizeable output losses than
does the FNL method. We will see this more clearly in the next section.
1.4.3 Optimal output, inflation, and interest rate policy
When there is a positive preference shock, households evaluate their future consumption
more. In other words, they are more patient so they tend to save more and consume less,
putting downward pressure on output and the price level. To restore consumption and
output, we need a lower real rate. If the central bank was not restrained by the ZLB, he
could adjust the nominal interest rate so that the actual real interest rate is the same as
the natural real rate. However, because the ZLB is allowed, a big positive preference shock
causes the ZLB to bind. As a result, the actual real rate will be larger than the natural
real rate because the nominal interest rate cannot be negative, resulting in a sizable output
loss. For comparison, I experiment with different levels of overall economic distortion and
relative price dispersion.
The case of a non-distorted steady state
In this efficient economy, there exists a labor income subsidy designed to fully offset the
monopoly power so the overall economic distortion (Φ) is zero. Figure 1.3 shows the policy
function at each value of the preference shock given the initial relative price dispersion at
the steady state.
Without the ZLB and given the initial price dispersion at the steady state, the central
bank could achieve the target efficient output and price stabilization immediately in both
LQ and FNL models under any shock to preference (or decline in the natural real rate),
as shown by the dashed green lines in Panel B and C of Figure 1.3. This occurs because
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Figure 1.3: Optimal policy in the economy with a non-distorted steady state (Φ = 0).
Gross initial relative price dispersion is at the steady state (∆t−1 = ∆SS = 1).
the central bank can reduce the nominal interest rate and as a result the expected real
interest rate, one for one with the decline in the natural real rate, as shown by the dashed
green line in Panel A of Figure 1.3. Due to no lower bound applied, the nominal interest
rate could be reduced to be negative under a particular positive preference shock.
When the nominal interest rate is bounded from below, a big positive preference shock
might cause the natural real rate to decrease sharply. Given any expected inflation, even
though the central bank lowers the nominal interest rate to zero, the expected real interest
rate is still larger than the natural real rate. The ZLB binds and the output gap falls as
in Panel A and B of Figure 1.3. In the framework of monopolistic competition as in this
paper, the fall in output results in a decline in the optimal relative price, the price level,
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and, as a result, inflation, as in Panel C of Figure 1.3.
Panel A also shows that the interest rate policy is steeper in the FNL model than
in the no-bound model at the states where the ZLB is about to bind. This means that,
under a particular shock driving the economy near the ZLB, the central bank cuts interest
rates more aggressively in the FNL model than in the no-bound model. Consequently,
the lower bound can be reached more likely. Specifically, in the no-bound model, for the
nominal interest rate to hit the ZLB, we need a shock with a magnitude of 1.67 standard
deviations, corresponding to 2.8% per year. However, in the ZLB model, we only need a
shock with a magnitude of 1.2 standard deviations, or 2% per year, to drive the nominal
interest rate to the ZLB. This result is well-known in the literature, such as Adam and Billi
[2007]. The aggressiveness in cutting interest rates and the early binding comes from the
risk of hitting the ZLB and the interaction between private expectations and the optimal
interest rate policy responding to them.
In the framework of a stochastic ZLB, at any state near the brink of the liquidity trap
- where the output is smaller than the target level and the ZLB binds - there is always
a positive probability that another adverse shock will occur and push the economy into
the liquidity trap with output loss and deflation. This phenomenon does not exist in a
no-bound or perfect foresight model, such as Jung et al. [2005]. Hence, there always exists
an expected deflation that raises the expected real interest rate, putting more downward
pressure on actual output and inflation. As a result, the central bank cuts the nominal
interest rate more aggressively than it would do in the other models. This aggressive cut, in
turn, raises the probability that the ZLB will be hit, increasing further expected deflation
and output losses and generating additional downward pressure on these variables. The
closer to the lower bound, the higher the probability that the economy is pushed into the
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liquidity trap with deflation, causing larger cuts in the nominal interest rate compared to
the no-ZLB or perfect foresight models.
Adam and Billi [2007] ask whether a fully-nonlinear model might generate policy func-
tion different from theirs. By solving a FNL model, I am able to answer the question.9
The red dot-dashed lines in Figure 1.3 present the policy function using the LQ framework.
Without a particular positive shock, the optimal policy is very similar in the two models.
The finding is robust to the parameters and nature of shocks. The reason is that, when
Φ = 0, the steady state inflation and interest rate are the same in both models regardless
of the parameters and nature of shocks. Also, the relative price dispersion is zero in the
two models.
However, when a particular positive shock occurs and the ZLB binds, the central bank
can not stabilize the price level, so the current relative price dispersion increases from the
steady state and starts playing its role, as a negative technology shock, in the FNL model.
In this case, the FNL model generates more output loss and more decline in the price level
than does the LQ model, which keeps the relative price dispersion constant regardless of
the state of the economy, as in Panel D of Figure 1.3.
To investigate the role of initial relative price dispersion under the ZLB, I plot the
optimal policy using different values of initial relative price dispersion, as in Figure 1.4.
The solid blue lines show the policy function when the initial relative price dispersion is 0%
annually, while the dash-dotted red lines and dashed green lines show the policy function
when the initial relative price dispersion is at 3.5% and 10% respectively.
As shown in Figure 1.4, when the initial relative price dispersion is 10%, the nominal
9Fernandez-Villaverde et al. [2012] claim that results from a fully nonlinear model are very different
from those in the LQ model. However, they model monetary policy using a Taylor rule with an inflation
target of 2% instead of zero inflation target as in this part. Judd et al. [2011] compare the results from
their nonlinear method with those from the perturbation method, not with the LQ method.
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Figure 1.4: Optimal policy in the economy with a non-distorted steady state (Φ = 0),
with different values of initial relative price dispersion, in the FNL model.
interest rate is about 1.2% higher than it would otherwise if the initial relative price
dispersion is zero. The current relative price dispersion is about 7.8%, which is 2.2% lower
than the initial value. The output loss is about 3%, substantially high relative to the
steady state, due to high dispersion of relative prices. The economy experiences deflation.
Intuitively, when the initial relative price dispersion is large, the inefficiency wedge
is high, and the central bank would implement highly contractionary monetary policy
by pursuing higher nominal interest rates on average than it would otherwise. By doing
so, the central bank can lower the front-loading price setting behavior of firms, and as a
result, lower the current relative price dispersion. In this case, the monetary policy is so
contractionary that it creates deflation. Interestingly, due to high nominal interest rates
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on average the ZLB is less likely to bind. For example, in the case of 10% initial relative
price dispersion, the ZLB binds only when there is a shock with a magnitude of at least
2.8% occurring.
The case of a distorted steady state
In this section, I investigate the economy with a distorted steady state. In this case, I
choose the labor income tax to be 11%, and, as a result, the overall economic distortion (Φ)
in this economy is 0.20. This means that at the steady state, the economy produces much
less than the efficient output level. With this overall economic distortion, the central bank
no longer targets zero inflation. The deterministic steady state inflation is about 2.4%
that is associated with the steady state interest rate and price dispersion of 5.2% and
1.2%, respectively. Figure 1.5 shows the optimal policy where the relative price dispersion
is set at the steady state of 1.0029 (or 1.2% annually).
The solid blue lines show the policy function in the FNL model. We can easily see that
on average the central bank pursue higher inflation and nominal interest rate in the FNL
model than in the LQ model. Without a particular positive preference shock, the central
bank implements the inflation rate and interest rate of around 2.4% and 5.2% respectively.
The higher the average inflation and interest rates, the less likely the ZLB will bind. In the
first case of zero overall economic distortion, the steady state inflation and interest rate
are 0 and 2.8%. A positive preference shock with a magnitude of 1.2 standard deviations,
which reduces the natural real rate by 2% annually, can make the ZLB to bind in the first
case. However, in this case of a distorted steady state, with 2.4% inflation target and 5.2%
steady state interest rate, it requires a much more severe shock to drive the economy to
the ZLB - about 3 standard deviations (or reducing the natural real rate by 5% annually).
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Figure 1.5: Optimal policy in the economy with a distorted steady state (Φ = 0.20).
Note that the initial relative price dispersion at the deterministic steady state (∆t−1 =
∆SS = 1.0029, or 1.2% per year).
Some papers, including Coibion et al. [2011], and Klaeing and Perez [2003], model
inflation targeting as a preventive method for the ZLB problem. The central bank in
their model uses Taylor rules and targets a positive inflation level that might not be the
optimal steady state inflation. In this paper, the positive steady state inflation is optimal
and endogenously determined by the degree of overall economic distortion.
More importantly, when the economy is near the ZLB, the central bank in the econ-
omy with zero overall economic distortion cuts interest rate more aggressively than in the
economy with positive distortion. The intuition is that, in the case of a large overall eco-
nomic distortion, the central bank pursues a positive inflation target. Hence, the nominal
interest rate is high on average. For the economy to be near the ZLB, it requires a partic-
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ular adverse preference shock to occur. Because the preference process is mean-reverting,
it is rather unlikely that another adverse shock will happen and push the economy into
the liquidity trap with output loss and low inflation. As a result, the downward pressure
on the conditional expected inflation is very small, generating small pressure on lowering
further the nominal interest rate. Therefore, interest rate cut is not as big as it would be
in an economy with a smaller overall economic distortion.
Unlike the case of a non-distorted steady state, in this case the ZLB and liquidity trap
are not necessarily associated with deflation. The reason is that the expected inflation
is high in this case. Even if an adverse demand shock occurs and pushes the economy
into the liquidity trap with output loss and binding ZLB, downward pressure on the price
level may not be big enough to offset the high expected inflation. So, the actual inflation
is positive. For example, at the preference of 6% higher than the steady state value (or
the natural real rate is 6% lower than its steady state rate), output loss is 0.3% that is
associated with 2.3% inflation rate. The results with positive overall economic distortion
is consistent with what we have observed since the last recession where the federal funds
rate (FFR) is technically zero and inflation is moderately positive.
The policy function from the LQ framework is presented by the dash-dotted red lines
in Figure 1.5. They are less accurate compared with the true policy in the FNL model.
Specifically, in the LQ model, it requires a shock with a magnitude of 2.3 standard devia-
tions (or 4% per year) to drive the economy to the ZLB, while it requires a shock with a
magnitude of at least 3 standard deviations (or 5.2% per year) to make the ZLB reaching
in the FNL model. In addition, given that the ZLB is binding in both models, the output
loss and inflation decline are much larger in the LQ model. Particularly, when the time
discount factor is 8% higher than its steady state value (or the natural real rate is 8%
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smaller than its steady state), the bounds are binding in both models.10 The output falls
by 2.2% associated with an inflation rate decline of 1.7% in the LQ model, compared to
1.25% and 0.4% in the FNL model.
This occurs due to the fact that the central bank in the LQ approach pursues lower in-
flation and nominal interest rate on average because of the inaccuracy of the LQ approach.
Intuitively, the inaccuracy of the LQ model comes from the fact that the LQ method elim-
inates the endogenous state variable called relative price dispersion. As shown in Panel D
of Figure 1.5, in the LQ framework, the relative price dispersion is always 0% annually,
while it is 1.2% in the FNL model. And we know that higher relative price dispersion is
associated with higher inflation, as in equation (2.35) . So an adverse shock that causes
the ZLB to bind in the FNL model to bind must generate more slackness in the LQ model.
As a result, the output loss and decline in inflation are greater in the LQ model than in
the FNL model.
Figure 1.5 also shows that when the economy is near the ZLB, the interest rate is cut
more aggressively in the LQ model than in the FNL model. The intuition is the same as
above. With a larger overall economic distortion, inflation and nominal interest rate in
the LQ model are more inaccurate and smaller than those in the true model, which is the
FNL model. Therefore, the ZLB in the LQ model is more likely to bind and the economy
is more likely to be pushed in the liquidity trap with lower inflation. When the economy is
near the ZLB, downward pressure on the conditional expected inflation in the LQ model
is larger than in the FNL model, resulting in a more aggressive cut in interest rate.
To extend the results from Yun [2005], I investigate the role of initial relative price
dispersion and report the results in Figure 1.6. When the initial dispersion is greater than
10The shock is slightly above three standard deviations.
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Figure 1.6: Optimal policy in the economy with a distorted steady state (Φ = 0.2), with
different values of initial relative price dispersion, in the FNL model.
the steady state value of 1.2%, both output gap and inflation fall further than they would
if the initial dispersion is kept at the steady state value. The opposite results occur if
the initial dispersion is smaller than the steady state value. Again, this happens because
the relative price dispersion is positively correlated with the initial dispersion as we see in
Figure 1.1.
In addition, the relative price dispersion plays the role of endogenous technology in
the aggregate production function. The higher the relative price dispersion, the lower the
technology and the lower the output. Therefore, the additional output loss (gain) depends
on whether the initial relative price dispersion is greater (smaller) than its steady state
value. Also, we see in Figure 1.5 that the central bank implement interest rate policy
30
higher with a higher value of the initial relative price dispersion, making the ZLB less
likely to bind.
1.4.4 What is the optimal inflation rate?
Since the late 1990s when Japan fell into the liquidity trap with binding ZLB, economists,
such as Krugman [1998], have been debating about whether central banks should target
a significantly positive inflation target and what the optimal inflation rate is. The topics
become even more important nowadays as the U.S. federal funds rate have been at zero
since December 2008 while the US economy has been experiencing the greatest slump after
the Great Depression. Blanchard et al. [2010] suggest that policymakers might consider
a optimal inflation target of around 4%. The suggestion lies under the argument that, in
the presence of the ZLB, significantly positive inflation creates leeway for the central bank
to deal with a particular adverse demand shock that would drive the economy into the
liquidity trap with binding ZLB.
However, positive inflation does not come at no cost. Higher inflation is always asso-
ciated with more front-loading behavior of firms when they have a chance to reset their
prices. As a result, it is associated with higher relative price dispersion and lower output.
This occurs because if the firms know that inflation is high and they cannot adjust their
prices flexibly in the future, they will set higher prices today, causing higher relative price
dispersion.
In this section, I am going to use the FNL model to answer a very important policy
question - what is the optimal inflation target the central bank, acting as the social planner,
should pursue by setting the size of overall economic distortion or tax rate accordingly, as
in equation (1.20)? For example, the social planner can choose a 2% inflation target by
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setting overall economic distortion of 0.18, or 9% income tax.
Figure 1.7: Average welfare relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. The
probability of hitting the ZLB is around 6% in the non-distorted case.
To answer the above question, first I solve the FNL model with respect to different
values of the overall economic distortion. Then, based on the optimal policy, I compute the
corresponding inflation target, which is the average long run inflation from a simulation
of 300, 000 periods. Also, I compute the simulated probability of hitting the ZLB using
these 300, 000 period. As shown in Figure 1.7, with the y-axis in the left, the higher the
overall economic distortion, the higher the inflation target and the lower the probability
of hitting the ZLB. For example, if the overall economic distortion is zero, or the income
tax rate is −11%, the average long run inflation is around −0.02% and the probability of
hitting the ZLB is around 6%.
The solid red line in Figure 1.7, with the y-axis in the right, presents the unconditional
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welfare relative to the one associated with the non-distorted steady state, as the function
of overall economic distortion. To compute this unconditional relative welfare, for each
value of overall economic distortion, I first solve for the value function as the function of
the initial relative price distortion and preference shock. Then, I take a random sample
of 300, 000 preference shocks, and I compute the average welfare, given the initial relative
price distortion at the steady state. Eventually, I compute the unconditional welfare gain
as percentage change from the one associated with the non-distorted steady state.
It is very surprising that the unconditional welfare is decreasing in the size of the
overall distortion. In other words, the unconditional expected welfare is maximal when
the overall economic distortion is around zero. This happens even when the average long
run inflation is approximately zero and the probability of hitting the ZLB is the greatest.
Therefore, the optimal inflation rate is approximately zero.
The intuition is that although the benefit of a significantly positive inflation target
relative to the non-distorted case is high conditional on a particular demand shock driving
the economy to the liquidity trap with binding ZLB, as shown by the red lines in Figure
1.8, such a shock is rather unlikely to occur. While the economy has to incur welfare
loss associated with positive inflation almost every period. In sum, the unconditional
welfare declines in inflation and overall economic distortion. For example, with the overall
economic distortion of 0.03 or the average long run inflation of 0.25% per year, the welfare
is smaller than the non-distorted welfare about 0.01 in almost all states of the preference
shock, as presented by the thick solid red line in Figure 1.8. Only a shock with a magnitude
of at least 6.7% (or 4 standard deviations), the welfare gain relative to the non-distorted
case is positive. Therefore, on average, the unconditional welfare corresponding to the long
run inflation of 0.25% per year is smaller than the one with the inflation rate of −0.02%.
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Figure 1.8: Welfare relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. The probability
of hitting the ZLB is around 6% in the non-distorted case.
1.4.5 Sensitivity analysis
For robustness check, in this section, I raise the variance of the preference shock such that
the unconditional probability of hitting the ZLB increases from 6% to around 9.5% in
the economy with non-distorted steady state. In this case, although the optimal inflation
target is no longer zero, it is not significantly greater than zero. Figure 1.9 shows that
the average welfare increases in inflation when inflation is small, after a point, it decreases
in inflation. The welfare is maximized when the overall economic distortion is set around
0.01, corresponding to the average long run inflation of 0.02% per year.
Figure 1.10 shows that, when the size of the overall economic distortion is zero or the
long run inflation is around −0.07%, a small increase in the size of distortion will make
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Figure 1.9: Average welfare relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. The
probability of hitting the ZLB is 9.5% in the non-distorted case.
welfare relatively higher than the case of no distortion given binding ZLB, while the welfare
loss is not significant conditional on no binding ZLB. On average, the unconditional welfare
is larger relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. However, when the size of overall
economic distortion is large, the cost of inflation increases substantially. Although welfare
gain is relatively high under a particular shock driving the economy into the liquidity trap
with binding ZLB, it is much lower when the economy is in normal times. On average,
the unconditional welfare is smaller relative to the non-distorted case.
1.5 Conclusion
In this paper, I study optimal monetary policy under discretion in the presence of the
occasionally binding ZLB. My contribution to the existing literature of the ZLB is twofold.
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Figure 1.10: Welfare relative to the case of non-distorted steady state. The probability
of hitting the ZLB is 9.5% in the non-distorted case.
First, in contrast to the existing literature assuming an efficient steady state, I allow for
the case of distorted steady state due to both monopoly and taxation, and study the
impact of this overall distortion on optimal monetary policy in the presence of the ZLB.
Second, unlike the existing literature that uses the LQ approach, I solve a FNL model
using a global method. Also, I provide a comparison between the FNL and LQ models.
Using the FNL method, I find new implications for optimal discretionary monetary
policy. First, when the economy escapes from the liquidity trap, the central bank in an
economy with highly distorted steady state should not implement zero nominal interest
rate for an extended period of time. Second, the central bank should choose approximately
zero inflation target even when the unconditional probability of hitting the ZLB is as high
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as 9.5%.
I show that the FNL and LQ models produce very different optimal policy when there
is a particular adverse demand shock that makes the ZLB binding, even in the case of non-
distorted steady state. In the case of highly distorted steady state, simplifying the FNL
model using the LQ approach will result in two main inaccuracies. First, the probability
of hitting the ZLB is higher in the LQ approach than in the FNL method. Second, with
a higher probability of hitting the ZLB, the nominal interest rate cut is more aggressive
in the LQ model, given a particular adverse demand shock that drives the economy close
to the ZLB. The inaccuracies of the LQ approach result from the fact that it eliminates
the relative price dispersion by the first order approximation.
There are different directions to extending my paper and to investigating the ZLB as
a friction that transmits adverse shocks and amplifies macroeconomic fluctuations. First,
we can use the fully nonlinear method in this paper to find out if commitment policy is
still better than discretion policy when we allow for a large economic distortion. Assum-
ing zero overall economic distortion and comparing optimal policy under discretion and
commitment, as done in the literature, is misleading because the role of inflation is un-
derestimated. Second, we can apply the FNL method to examine the interaction between
the ZLB and other frictions as a transmission mechanism that magnifies macroeconomic
fluctuations. The second chapter of the dissertation studies the interaction of incomplete
financial markets and the ZLB in generating a great recession.
1.6 Appendices: Chapter 1
1.6.1 Discretionary optimal policy under ZLB
V (∆t−1, βt) = max{it,Ct,Nt,St,Ft,pit,∆t}
{
C1−γt
1− γ − χ
N1+ηt
1 + η
+ βtEtV (∆t, βt+1)
}
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Subject to
C−γt
(1 + it)
= βtEt
[
C−γt+1
Πt+1
]
= βtEt [Z1 (∆t, βt+1)]
Ft − C−γ+1t = θβtEt
[
Πε−1t+1Ft+1
]
= θβtEt [Z2 (∆t, βt+1)]
St − χCtN
η
t
(1− Φ) = θβtEt
[
Πεt+1St+1
]
= θβtEt [Z3 (∆t, βt+1)]
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
+ θΠεt∆t−1
St = Ft
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
Ct = Nt (∆t)
−1
it ≥ 0
I rewrite the problem in the Lagrangian form as follow:
L =
C1−γt
1− γ − χ
N1+ηt
1 + η
+ βtEtV (∆t, βt+1)
− λ1t
[
C−γt
(1 + it)
− βtEt [Z1 (∆t, βt+1)]
]
− λ2t
[
Ft − C−γ+1t − θβtEt [Z2 (∆t, βt+1)]
]
−λ3t
[
St − χCtN
η
t
(1− Φ) − θβtEt [Z3 (∆t, βt+1)]
]
−λ4t
[
∆t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
− θΠεt∆t−1
]
−λ5t
St − Ft(1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε

−λ6t
[
Ct −Nt (∆t)−1
]
The first order conditions:
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it : λ1tC
−γ
t (1 + it)
−2 ≤ 0 with equality if (1 + it) > 1
Ct : 0 = C
−γ
t + λ1tγC
−γ−1
t /(1 + it) + (1− γ)λ2tC−γt + λ3t
χNηt
(1− Φ) − λ6t
Nt : 0 = −χNηt + λ3t
χηCtN
η−1
t
(1− Φ) + λ6t∆
−1
t ,
Ft : 0 = −λ2t + λ5t
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
St : 0 = −λ3t − λ5t
pit : 0 = −λ4tε
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1
θΠε−2t + λ4tεθΠ
ε−1
t ∆t−1
+ λ5tFt
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) −ε
ε−1 θΠε−2t
1− θ
∆t : 0 = βtEtV∆ (∆t, βt+1) + λ1tβtEt [Z1∆ (∆t, βt+1)]
+λ2tθβtEt [Z2∆ (∆t, βt+1)] + λ3tθβtEt [Z3∆ (∆t, βt+1)]
−λ4t − λ6tNt∆−2t
and the envelope theorem:
V∆(∆t−1, βt) = λ4tθΠεt
where Zi∆ denotes partial derivative of Zi with respect to ∆. Simplifying and combining
with equilibrium conditions, we obtain 13 equations with 13 variables (R,C,N, S, F,Π,∆,
λ1, ..., λ6)
′
(1) it : 0 = max(λ1tC
−γ
t (1 + it)
−2 , it)
(2) Ct : 0 = C
−γ
t + λ1tγC
−γ−1
t /(1 + it) + (1− γ)λ2tC−γt + λ3t
χNηt
(1− Φ) − λ6t
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(3) Nt : 0 = −χNηt + λ3t
χηCtN
η−1
t
(1− Φ) + λ6t∆
−1
t ,
(4) Ft : 0 = −λ2t + λ5t
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
(5) St : 0 = −λ3t − λ5t
(6) pit : 0 = −λ4tε
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1
+ λ4tεΠt∆t−1
+ λ5tFt
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) −ε
ε−1 1
1− θ
(7) ∆t : 0 = θβtEt
[
λ4t+1Π
ε
t+1
]
+ λ1tβtEt [Z1∆ (∆t, βt+1)]
+λ2tθβtEt [Z2∆ (∆t, βt+1)] + λ3tθβtEt [Z3∆ (∆t, βt+1)]
−λ4t − λ6tNt∆−2t
(8) λ1t : 0 =
C−γt
(1 + it)
− βtEt [Z1 (∆t, βt+1)]
(9) λ2t : 0 = Ft − C−γ+1t − θβtEt [Z2 (∆t, βt+1)]
(10) λ3t : 0 = St − χCtN
η
t
(1− Φ) − θβtEt [Z3 (∆t, βt+1)]
(11) λ4t : 0 = ∆t − (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
− θΠεt∆t−1
(12) λ5t : 0 = St − Ft
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
(13) λ6t : 0 = Ct −Nt (∆t)−1
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where
Z1 (∆t, βt+1) =
C−γt+1
Πt+1
Z2 (∆t, βt+1) = Π
ε−1
t+1Ft+1
Z3 (∆t, βt+1) = Π
ε
t+1St+1
Z4 (∆t, βt+1) = Π
ε
t+1λ4t+1
The solution of the above nonlinear system is the function of the state, st = (∆t−1, βt) ,
where ∆t−1 is the endogenous and , βt are the exogenous states with the following law of
motion:
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
+ θΠεt∆t−1
ln (βt+1) = (1− ρβ) ln
(
β
)
+ ρβ ln (βt) + ε
β
t+1
1.6.2 Solution method
I rewrite the above 13 functional equations with 13 unknown policy functions in a more
compact form:
f (s,X (s) , E [Z(X (s′))] , E [Z∆(X (s′))]) = 0
Here f : R3+13+4+4 → R13 is the equilibrium relationship.
where
s = (∆, β) is the current state of the economy
X(s) = (R(s), C(s), N(s), F (s), S(s),Π(s),∆(s), λ1(s), ..., λ6(s))
′ is the policy function
we need to solve, X : R3 → R13.
s′ is next period state that evolves according to the following motion equation:
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s
′
= g(s,X(s), ε) =
 ∆′ = (1− θ)
(
1−θΠ(s)ε−1
1−θ
) ε
ε−1
+ θΠ (s)ε ∆
β′ = β(1−ρβ)βρβ exp(εβ)

ε = [εβ]is the innovations of the preference shock.
Z(X (s′)) =

Z1 (X (s
′)) = C(s
′)−γ
Π(s′)
Z2 (X (s
′)) = Π (s′)ε−1 F (s′)
Z3 (X (s
′)) = Π (s′)ε S (s′)
Z4 (X (s
′)) = Π (s′)ε λ4 (s′)

Z∆(X (s
′)) =

Z1∆ (X (s
′)) = −γC(s′)−γ−1C∆(s′)Π(s′) − C(s
′)−γΠ∆(s′)
Π(s′)2
Z2∆ (X (s
′)) = (ε− 1) Π (s′)ε−2 Π∆ (s′)F (s′) + Π (s′)ε−1 F∆ (s′)
Z3∆ (X (s
′)) = εΠ (s′)ε−1 Π∆ (s′)S (s′) + Π (s′)
ε S∆ (s
′)
Z4∆ (X (s
′)) = εΠ (s′)ε−1 Π∆ (s′)λ4 (s′) + Π (s′)
ε λ4∆ (s
′)

I solve the above equilibrium relationship using a collocation method, where collocation
nodes are non-equidistant in the sense that these nodes concentrate around potential kinks.
First, I use equidistant nodes to solve the model using the below algorithm and find out
policy function based on which I investigate potential kinds. I redistribute these nodes by
clustering them around potential kinks, then resolve the model.
Below is the simplified algorithm of the collocation method:
Step 1: Define the space of the approximating functions and collocation
nodes S = (S1, ..., SN ), where N = N∆ ×Nβ and (N∆ ×Nβ) is the polynomial degrees
in each dimension of the space. In this paper, I use cubic spline method where N∆ ×Nβ
are number of collocations nodes along each state dimension.
X(s) = (φ(s)θR, φ(s)θC , φ(s)θN , φ(s)θF , φ(s)θS , φ(s)θΠ, φ(s)θ∆, φ(s)θλ1 , ..., φ(s)θλ6)
′ ;
or X(s) = φ(s)Θ
where
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• φ(s) is a 1 × N matrix of cubic spline basis functions evaluated at state s ∈ S =
(S1, ..., SN ) .
• Θ = (θR; θC ; θN ; θF ; θS ; θΠ; θ∆; θλ1 ; ...; θλ6) is N × 13 coefficient matrix that we want
to approximate.
Step 2: Initialize the coefficient matrix Θ0, and set up stopping rules.
Step 3: At each iteration j we have a corresponding Θj , implement the
following substep:
1. At each collocation node si, si ∈ {S1..SN} : compute E [Z(X (s′))] , E [Z∆(X (s′))] :
• E [Z(X (s′))] = ∑j wj [Z(X (g (s,X(s′), ej)))]
• E [Z∆(X (s′))] =
∑
j wj [Z∆(X (g (s,X(s
′), ej)))]
2. Solve for X(si) s.t. f (si, X(si), E [Z(X (s
′))] , E [Z∆(X (s′))]) = 0, I solve this com-
plementarity problem using Newton method and semi-smooth root finding formula-
tions laid in Miranda and Fackler (2003). I also provide an "analytical" Jacobian
matrix fX (see the formula below).
11 Both semi-smooth root finding and "analyt-
ical" Jacobian matrix help to significantly boost the speed of solving the problem
and make the solver very reliable.
Step 4: Update Θj+1 = Φ−1Θj , where Φ = (φ(s1), ..., φ(sN ))′.
Step 5: Check the stopping rules. If not satisfied go to Step 3; otherwise
go to Step 6.
Step 6: Report results.
11"Analytical" because the first and second derivatives are computed using the approximating functions.
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In the paper, I obtain the maximum absolute error of 1e-4 across equilibrium conditions
for some states, smaller than 1e-6 for almost all other states. By using more points, I can
obtain more accurate results. There is another way to solve for the policy functions. I can
define the residual function, r(s,Θ) = f (s,X (s) , E [Z(X (s′))] , E [Z∆(X (s′))]) and use
Newton's method to solve r(s,Θ) = 0 by updating Θj+1 = Θj −α [rΘ (s,Θj)]−1 r(s,Θj),
where rΘ
(
s,Θj
)
is an "analytical" Jacobian matrix. I tried this method but it is extremely
slow due to the inverse of a large coefficient matrix.
1.6.3 "Analytical" Jacobian matrix, fX
f1X =

−2R−3t C−γt λ1t, R−2t (−γ)C−γ−1t λ1t, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, C−γt R−2t , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0;
if λ1tC
−γ
t R
−2
t > Rt − 1
−1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0; if λ1tC−γt R−2t ≤ Rt − 1

f2X =
 −
λ1tγC
−γ−1
t
(1+it)2
,−γC−γ−1t − λ1tγ(γ+1)C
−γ−2
t
(1+it)
− (1− γ) γλ2tC−γ−1t , λ3t χηN
η−1
t
(1−Φ) , ...
0, 0, 0, 0,
γC−γ−1t
(1+it)
, (1− γ)C−γt , χN
η
t
(1−Φ) , 0, 0,−1;

f3X =
 0, λ3t
χηNη−1t
(1−Φ) ,−χηNη−1t + λ3t
χη(η−1)CtNη−2t
(1−Φ) , 0, 0, 0,−λ6t∆2t , 0, 0,
χηCtN
η−1
t
(1−Φ) , ...
0, 0, 1∆t ;

f4X =
0, 0, 0, 0, 0, λ5t(1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) ε
1−ε θΠε−2t
1− θ , 0, 0,−1, 0, 0,
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
, 0;

f5X = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0,−1, 0,−1, 0; )
f6X =

0, 0, 0, λ5t
(
1−θΠε−1t
1−θ
) −ε
ε−1 1
1−θ , 0, λ4t
(
1−θΠε−1t
1−θ
) 2−ε
ε−1 εθΠε−2t
1−θ + λ4tε∆t−1 + ...
λ5tFt
(
1−θΠε−1t
1−θ
)−2ε+1
ε−1 εθΠε−2
(1−θ)2 , 0, 0, 0, 0,−ε
(
1−θΠε−1t
1−θ
) 1
ε−1
+ εΠt∆t−1, ...
Ft
(
1−θΠε−1t
1−θ
) −ε
ε−1 1
1−θ , 0;

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f7X =

0, 0,−λ6t
∆2t
, 0, 0, 0, θβt(Et [Z4∆t+1] + λ1tEt [Z1∆∆t+1] ...
/θ + λ2tEt [Z2∆∆t+1] + λ3tEt [Z3∆∆t+1]) +
2λ6tNt
∆3t
, ...
βtEt [Z1∆t+1] , θβtEt [Z2∆t+1] , θβtEt [Z3∆t+1] ,−1, 0,−Nt∆2t ;

f8X =
(
− C
−γ
t
(1 + it)2
,
−γC−γ−1t
(1 + it)
, 0, 0, 0, 0, βtEt [Z1∆t+1] , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0;
)
f9X =
(
0,− (−γ + 1)C−γt , 0, 1, 0, 0, θβtEt [Z2∆t+1] , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0;
)
f10X =
(
0,− χN
η
t
(1− Φ) ,−
χηCtN
η−1
t
(1− Φ) , 0, 1, 0, θβtEt [Z3∆t+1] , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0;
)
f11X =
0, 0, 0, 0, 0,(1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
ε−1
εθΠε−2t − θεΠε−1t ∆t−1, 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0;

f12X =
0, 0, 0,−(1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
, 1,−Ft
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) ε
1−ε θΠε−2t
1− θ , 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0;

f13X =
(
0, 1,− 1
∆t
, 0, 0, 0,
Nt
∆2t
, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0;
)
where
Z1∆t+1 = −
γC−γ−1t+1 C∆t+1
Πt+1
− C
−γ
t+1Π∆t+1
Π2t+1
Z2∆t+1 = (ε− 1) Πε−2t+1 Π∆t+1Ft+1 + Πε−1t+1F∆t+1
Z3∆t+1 = εΠ
ε−1
t+1 Π∆t+1St+1 + Π
ε
t+1S∆t+1
Z4∆t+1 = εΠ
ε−1
t+1 Π∆t+1λ4t+1 + Π
ε
t+1λ4∆t+1
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Z1∆∆t+1 =
γ (γ + 1)C−γ−2t+1 C
2
∆t+1
Πt+1
− γC−γ−1t+1
(
C∆∆t+1
Πt+1
− C∆t+1Π∆t+1
Π2t+1
)
γC−γ−1t+1 C∆t+1Π∆t+1
Π2t+1
− C−γt+1
(
Π∆∆t+1
Π2t+1
− 2Π
2
∆t+1
Π3t+1
)
Z2∆∆t+1 = (ε− 1) (ε− 2) Πε−3t+1 Π2∆t+1Ft+1 + (ε− 1) Πε−2t+1 (Π∆∆t+1Ft+1 + Π∆t+1F∆t+1)
+ (ε− 1) Πε−2t+1 Π∆t+1F∆t+1 + Πε−1t+1F∆∆t+1
Z3∆∆t+1 = ε (ε− 1) Πε−2t+1 Π2∆t+1St+1 + εΠε−1t+1 (Π∆∆t+1St+1 + Π∆t+1S∆t+1)
+ εΠε−1t+1 Π∆t+1S∆t+1 + Π
ε
t+1S∆∆t+1
Z3∆∆t+1 = ε (ε− 1) Πε−2t+1 Π2∆t+1λ4t+1 + εΠε−1t+1 Π∆∆t+1λ4t+1 + Π∆t+1λ4∆t+1
+ εΠε−1t+1 Π∆t+1λ4∆t+1 + Π
ε
t+1λ4∆∆t+1
1.6.4 Simplified LQ model of the FNL model
The LQ version of the FNL model is:
Max
{
−ΩE0
∞∑
t=0
βt
{
pi2t + λ (xt − x∗)2
}}
subject to
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
γ
[̂
it − Etpit+1
]
+
1
γ
[
−β̂t
]
pit = βEt [pit+1] + κxt
β̂t = ln (βt)− lnβ = ρββ̂t−1 + εβ,t
ît ≥ log (β)
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where
pit = log (1 + pit)
ît = log (1 + it)− log(1/β)
xt =
(
log(Yt)− log(Y )
)− (log(Y ft )− log(Y f ))
Ω = −1
2
(γ + η)
ε
(γ + η)
θ
(1− θ) (1− θβ)C
−γ+1
λ =
(γ + η)
ε
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
θ
=
κ
ε
x∗ =
Φ
γ + η
Φ = 1− (1− τw)
(
1− ε−1)
It is not difficult to show that the steady state values of this model are as follows:
pˆi =
λκ
κ2 + λ (1− β)x
∗
̂ˆı = pˆi
x¯ =
(1− β) pˆi
κ
Proof:
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Log-linearize the constraints
• Log-linearize the aggregate price and the price dispersion:
Pt =
(∫ 1
0
Pt (i)
1−ε di
) 1
1−ε
P̂t ≈
∫ 1
0
P̂ (i)di
∆t =
∫ 1
0
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−ε
di
∆̂t ≈ −ε
∫ 1
0
(
P̂t (i)− P̂t
)
di
≈ 0
p∗t =
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
p̂∗t ≈
(
θΠε−1
1− θΠε−1
)
Π̂t
• Then we log-linearize the other constraints:
C−γt
Rt
= βtEt
[
C−γt+1
Πt+1
]
−γĈt − R̂t = Et
(
−γĈt+1 − Π̂t+1 + β̂t
)
Ĉt = EtĈt+1 − 1
γ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1 + β̂t
)
Ft − C−γ+1t = θβtEt
[
Πε−1t+1Ft+1
]
FF̂t − C−γ+1 (−γ + 1) Ĉt = θβΠε−1FEt
[
β̂t + (ε− 1) Π̂t+1 + F̂t+1
]
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St − χCtN
η
t
(1− Φ) = θβtEt
[
Πεt+1St+1
]
St − C−γ+1t ϕt = θβtEt
[
Πεt+1St+1
]
SŜt − C−γ+1ϕ
(
(−γ + 1) Ĉt + ϕ̂t
)
= θβΠεS
(
β̂t + εΠ̂t+1 + Ŝt+1
)
ϕt =
χCγt N
η
t
(1− Φ)
ϕ̂t = γĈt + ηN̂t
∆t = (1− θ)
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) ε
ε−1
+ θΠεt∆t−1
∆t = (1− θ) (p∗t )−ε + θΠεt∆t−1
∆∆̂t = − (1− θ) p∗−εεp̂∗t + θ∆ΠεεΠ̂t + θΠ∆∆̂t−1
St = Ft
(
1− θΠε−1t
1− θ
) 1
1−ε
St = Ftp
∗
t
Ŝt = F̂t + p̂
∗
t
Ct = Nt (∆t)
−1
Ĉt = N̂t − ∆̂t
Rt = 1 + rt ≥ 1
R̂t ≥ −R
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• Under discretionary policy, steady state values associated with zero inflation:
Φ = 0
C = N = 1/3
Π = 1, p∗ = 1, ϕ = 1
R = 1/β
∆ = 1
χ = N−γ−η
S = F =
N−γ+1
1− θβ
• In the steady state with flexible price and some distortion Φ, we have
p∗ = 1,∆ = 1,Φ > 0
Πf : not identified, can be any value, i.e.Πf = 1
Cf = Nf = N · (1− Φ) 1η+γ
Rf = 1/β
Sf = ϕ =
1
µ
F f = 1
• Note that X̂t = log
(
Xt
X
)
for any variable Xt, where X is the steady state (dependent
of overall economic distortion and monetary policy type).
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• Simplifying the loglinearized constraints using the steady state values associated with
zero inflation under the discretionary monetary policy, we obtain:
P̂t =
∫ 1
0
P̂t(i)di
∆̂t = 0
p̂∗t =
θ
(1− θ)Π̂t
Ĉt = EtĈt+1 − 1
γ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1 + β̂t
)
FF̂t − C−γ+1 (−γ + 1) Ĉt = θβFEt
[
β̂t + (ε− 1) Π̂t+1 + F̂t+1
]
SŜt − C−γ+1
(
(−γ + 1) Ĉt + ϕ̂t
)
= θβS
(
β̂t + εΠ̂t+1 + Ŝt+1
)
ϕ̂t = γĈt + ηN̂t
Ŝt = F̂t + p̂
∗
t
Ĉt = N̂t
R̂t ≥ −R
• Simplifying further:
Ĉt = EtĈt+1 − 1
γ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1 + β̂t
)
Π̂t = βEt
[
Π̂t+1
]
+
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
θ
ϕ̂t
ϕ̂t = γĈt + ηN̂t
Ĉt = N̂t
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R̂t ≥ −R
• Let Ĉft be the flexible price consumption/output, then ϕt = ϕ = 1 and ϕ̂t = 0 and
Ĉft = N̂
f
t = 0 because there is only preference shocks in the model.
• Let xt = Ĉt − Ĉft then we have
ϕ̂t = (γ + η)xt
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
γ
(
R̂t − EtΠ̂t+1 + β̂t
)
Π̂t = βEt
[
Π̂t+1
]
+ κxt
β̂t = ln (βt)− lnβ = ρββ̂t−1 + εβ,t
κ =
(1− θ) (1− θβ)
θ
(η + γ)
Quadratic approximation of the objective function: with small Φ
Following Walsh (2003,chapter 11) and Woodford (2003,chapter 6) and note that we have
a different utility function:
• The objective function E0
∑∞
t=0 {U(Ct, zt)− V (Nt, zt)}
where
U(Ct, zt) = βt
C1−γt
1−γ
V (Nt, zt) = βtχ
N1+ηt
1+η
βt =
(
t−1∏
k=0
βk
)
Ct =
(∫
y
1− 1
ε
it di
) ε
ε−1
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Nt =
∫
yitdi
zt = βt
• For any variable Xt, let X and X∗t denote the steady state and efficient values
respectively.
Let X˜t = Xt −X be the deviation of Xt around its steady state value
Let X̂t = ln(Xt/X) = lnXt − lnX be the the log deviation of Xt around its steady
state value.
X˜t = Xt −X = X
(
Xt
X
− 1
)
≈ X
(
X̂t +
1
2X̂
2
t
)
• Using second order approximation of the first term in the objective function at each
period t:
U(Ct, zt) ≈ CUC
{
Ĉt +
1
2
(
1 + CUCCUC
)
Ĉ2t +
UC,z
UC
ztĈt
}
+ terms independent of policy.
Let γ = −CUCCUC and φt = −
UC,z
CUCC
zt , then:
U(Ct, zt) ≈ CUC
{
Ĉt +
1
2 (1− γ) Ĉ2t + γφtĈt
}
+ t.i.p.
• Similarly,
V (Nt, zt) ≈ NVN
{
N̂t +
1
2
(
1 + CVNNVN
)
N̂2t +
VN,z
VN
ztN̂t
}
+ t.i.p.
Let η = NVNNVN and qt = −
VN,z
NVNN
zt , then:
V (Nt, zt) ≈ NVN
{
N̂t +
1
2 (1 + η) N̂
2
t − γqtN̂t
}
+ t.i.p.
In steady state equilibrium VN/UC = 1 − Φ. If Φ is small, such terms as ΦN̂2t and
ΦqtN̂t will be second order, and if no price dispersion then N = C, and we can obtain
V (Nt, zt) ≈ CUC
{
(1− Φ) N̂t + 12 (1 + η) N̂2t − γqtN̂t
}
+ t.i.p.
• Using the following relationships and ignore the terms such as Φvariŷit, (variŷit)2 , Ĉtvariŷit:
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N̂t ≈ Eiŷit + 12variŷit
Proof:
Nt =
∫
Nitdi =
∫
yitdi
logNt = log
(∫
exp(log yit)di
)
logNt ≈ logN +
∫ (∂ logNt
∂ log yit
) (
log yit − log Y
)
+12
∫ ∫ ( ∂2 logNt
∂ log yit∂ log yjt
) (
log yit − log Y
) (
log yjt − log Y
)
+ t.i.p
log Nt
N
≈ ∫ (∂ logNt∂ log yit)(log yitY )+ 12 ∫ ∫ ( ∂2 logNt∂ log yit∂ log yjt)(log yitY )(log yjtY )+ t.i.p
N̂t ≈
∫ (∂ logNt
∂ log yit
)
ŷit +
1
2
∫ ∫ ( ∂2 logNt
∂ log yit∂ log yjt
)
ŷitŷjt + t.i.p
∂ logNt
∂ log yit
=
(∫
exp(log yit)di
)−1
exp(log yit)(
∂ logNt
∂ log yit
)
=
(∫
exp(log Y )di
)−1
exp(log Y ) = 1
∂2 logNt
∂ log yit∂ log yjt|i 6=j = −
(∫
exp(log yit)di
)−2
exp 2(log yit)
∂2 logNt
∂ log yit∂ log yjt|i=j = −
(∫
exp(log yit)di
)−2
exp 2(log yit)
+
(∫
exp(log yit)di
)−1
exp(log yit)(
∂2 logNt
∂ log yit∂ log yjt|i 6=j
)
= −1(
∂2 logNt
∂ log yit∂ log yjt|i=j
)
= 0
N̂t ≈
∫
ŷit − 12
∫
i
∫
j 6=i ŷitŷjt + t.i.p
− ∫i ∫j 6=i ŷitŷjt = − ∫i ∫j ŷitŷjt + ∫i ŷ2it = − ∫i ŷit ∫j ŷjt + ∫i ŷ2it = − (Eiŷit)2 + Eiŷ2it =
variŷit
N̂t ≈ Eiŷit + 12variŷit + t.i.p
Ĉt ≈ Eiŷit + 12(1− ε−1)variŷit
Proof: same as for N̂t.
V (Nt, zt) ≈ CUC
{
(1− Φ− ηqt) Ĉt + 12 (1 + η) Ĉ2t + 12ε−1variŷit
}
+ t.i.p
• From the above derivation:
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U(Ct, zt)−V (Nt, zt) ≈ CUC
{
(Φ + γφt + ηqt) Ĉt − 12 (γ + η) Ĉ2t − 12ε−1variŷit
}
+ t.i.p
• Following Walsh (2003) for the rest of derivation:
Because Yit = (Pit/Pt)
−ε Yt , log YitY = −ε
(
log PitP − log PtP
)
+ log YtY or variŷit =
ε2vari log pit
U(Ct, zt)− V (Nt, zt) ≈ −12CUC
{
(γ + η) (xt − x∗t )2 +
[
ε−1ε2
]
vari log pit
}
+ t.i.p
E0
∑∞
t=0 {U(Ct, zt)− V (Nt, zt)}
= E0
∑∞
t=0−12 (γ + η)CUC
{
(xt − x∗t )2 + ε(γ+η)vari log pit
}
= E0
∑∞
t=0−12 (γ + η)CβtC
−γ {
(xt − x∗t )2 + ε(γ+η)vari log pit
}
= −12 (γ + η)C
1−γ {
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t (xt − x∗t )2 + ε(γ+η)E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tvari log pit
}
Note:
vari log pit = θvari log pit−1 +
(
θ
1−θ
)
pi2t∑∞
t=0 β
tvari log pit =
θ
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
∑∞
t=0 β
tpi2t + t.i.p.
Therefore
E0
∑∞
t=0 {U(Ct, zt)− V (Nt, zt)}
= −12 (γ + η)C
1−γ {
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t (xt − x∗t )2 +
(
ε
γ+η
)(
θ
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
)
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
tpi2t
}
= −12 (γ + η)C
1−γ
E0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
{
(xt − x∗t )2 +
(
ε
γ+η
)(
θ
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
)
pi2t
}
= −ΩE0
∑∞
t=0 β
t
{
λ (xt − x∗t )2 + pi2t
}
where
Ω = −12 (γ + η)
(
ε
γ+η
)(
θ
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
)
C
−γ+1
λ = (γ+η)ε
(1−θ)(1−θβ)
θ
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1.6.5 Solving the LQ model with zero lower bound
We can rewrite the above LQ model as following, using pit ≈ log(Πt) − log(Π), it ≈
log(Rt)− log(R):
V (βt) = max{it,pit,yt}
−
(
pi2t + λ (xt − x∗)2
)
+ βtEtV (βt)
Subject to
pit = βEtpit+1 + κxt : λ1t
xt = Etxt+1 − 1
γ
(it − Etpit+1) + 1
γ
[
−β̂t
]
: λ2t
it ≥ −(1/β − 1) = −r∗
• Lagrange
L = −
(
pi2t + λ (xt − x∗)2
)
+ βtEtV (βt)
− λ1t (pit − βEtpit+1 − κxt)
− λ2t
(
xt − Etxt+1 + 1
γ
(it − Etpit+1)− 1
γ
[
−β̂t
])
• The first order conditions:
(1) it : −λ2t 1
γ
≤ 0 with equality if it > −r∗;
(2) pit : −2pit − λ1t = 0;
(3) xt : 0 = −2λ (xt − x∗) + λ1tκ− λ2t,
(4) λ1t : 0 = −pit + βEtpit+1 + κxt
(5) λ2t : 0 = −xt + Etxt+1 − 1
γ
(it − Etpit+1) + 1
γ
[
−β̂t
]
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• Simplifying the above conditions, we obtain 3 equations with 3 variables Xt =
(it, pit, xt)
′
(1) 0 = max((2κpit + 2λ (xt − x∗)) 1
γ
, (−r∗ − it));
(2) 0 = −pit + βEtpit+1 + κxt
(3) 0 = −xt + Etxt+1 − 1
γ
(it − Etpit+1) + 1
γ
[
−β̂t
]
• We need to solve the model
f(Xt) = 0, where
f(Xt) =

max((2κpit + 2λ (xt − x∗)) 1γ , (−r∗ − it))
−pit + βEtpit+1 + κxt
−xt + Etxt+1 − 1γ (it − Etpit+1) + 1γ
[
−β̂t
]

∂f
∂Xt
=

∂f1
∂Xt
∂f2
∂Xt
∂f3
∂Xt
 =

0, 2κγ ,
2λ
γ
0,−1, κ
− 1γ , 0,−1
 if f1(X) = (2κpit + 2λxt)
1
γ
∂f
∂Xt
=

∂f1
∂Xt
∂f2
∂Xt
∂f3
∂Xt
 =

−1, 0, 0
0,−1, κ
− 1γ , 0,−1
 if f1(X) = −r
∗ − it
• Solutions are functions of state st = βt.
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• Steady state:
pi =
λκ
κ2 + λ(1− β)x
∗
i = pi
x =
(1− β)pi
κ
x∗ =
Φ
γ + η
λ1 = 2pi
λ2 = 0
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Chapter 2
Subprime Lending, Deleveraging and a Great
Recession
2.1 Introduction
There are two striking stylized facts in the last recession. First, there was a surge in
household leverage, defined as debt-to-income ratio, during the 2002-2006 period. As
documented in Mian and Sufi [2011], during this period, the debt-to-income ratio for the
existing homeowners, who owned a house in 1997, increased sharply by 0.7, from about 1.8.
This occurred due to the flood of funds in the U.S., the boom of the housing market, and
the willingness of the lenders in lending their money based on their price expectation of the
collateral assets, especially houses. Therefore, the implicit debt-to-value of collateral assets
was substantially high. Second, recession is worse in regions where household leverage had
increased more during the credit boom from 2002-2006, especially in the regions with
higher proportion of subprime borrowers. Obviously, the housing market and over-lending
play an important role in explaining the unprecedented deep recession that we have ever
observed since the Great Depression. However, the standard deleveraging model, including
Eggertsson and Krugman [2012] that is called the EK model thereafter, predicts that
including durable goods, such as houses, would mitigate the impact of an adverse shock
because households would cut back durable goods consumption.
In this paper I study the interaction of subprime lending, an incomplete financial mar-
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ket and the ZLB as a transmission mechanism that amplifies responses of macroeconomic
variables under a shock to the credit market. There are two key features that make my
paper different from the current literature on deleveraging, ZLB, and the liquidity trap.
First, in contrast to the existing ZLB literature that models the debt limit of the repre-
sentative borrowing-constrained household as an exogenous stochastic process, including
the EK model and Guerrieri and Lorenzoni [2011] that is called GL thereafter, in this
paper I endogenize the debt limit by tying it to both exogenous credit market conditions
and endogenous market value of collateral assets, which are houses. Second, and more
importantly, I allow for subprime lending by calibrating the model to match the observed
debt-to-income ratio at the onset of the housing burst.
Contradict to the prediction of the EK model, in the presence of subprime lending, I
am able to show that the model with endogenous debt limit generates a more powerful
transmission mechanism. The economy is much more responsive to a shock to the credit
market and the ZLB is more likely to bind. When the ZLB binds, a great recession emerges
with a free fall in output and the price level. The intuition is as follows. When an adverse
shock to the credit market occurs, the debt limit of the borrowers declines. They have to
cut back either nondurable or durable housing goods consumption. In general, a dollar
decrease in durable goods consumption would help to lower the current debt by a dollar.
As a result, it relaxes the collateral constraint by R dollar, where R is the gross real
interest rate. However, reducing 1 dollar of durable housing goods will lead to a fall of the
debt limit that is endogenously tied to the market value of the housing goods, resulting
to additional pressure on the collateral constraint. In an exogenous debt limit model,
such as the EK model, the additional pressure on the collateral constraint does not exit.
Therefore, in their model, a sharp decline in durable housing goods would occur.
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However, in the world where the initial debt-to-value is high, it is costly to cut durable
housing goods because it will put more pressure on the collateral constraint. Together
with the fact that houses provide some utility, the borrowers do not want to cut back their
durable housing consumption. However, because the durable and non-durable goods are
not perfectly substitutable, the durable goods must be reduced when the nondurable goods
consumption is cut back. The reduction in durable housing consumption leads to a further
decline in the debt limit, and, as a result, a further decline in non-durable and durable
goods consumption. This mechanism creates a spiral cut in durable housing quantity and
the debt limit tying to it.
Note that the above mechanism does not exit if the initial debt-to-value is small even
if we tie the debt limit to the market value of collateral assets. The reason is that if the
initial ratio is small, reducing durable goods consumption eventually helps to relax the
collateral constraint. Unfortunately, it is not the case when the debt-to-value of collateral
asset is as high as we observe in the U.S. credit market at the onset of the housing market
burst. In the paper, I calibrate the initial ratio to match a stylized fact that the debt-to-
income ratio is 2.2, which is in the middle of the 1.8− 2.5 range as reported in Mian and
Sufi [2011]. The calibration results in an initial debt-to-value ratio (called credit market
condition parameter) as high as 0.95. It is not surprising given what we observed in the
U.S. during the housing bubble. It is because the lenders tend to lend out money based
on their expectation of housing price appreciation.
Because the monetary policy in the paper is just a simple Taylor rule, the central bank
cannot stabilize output and inflation under an adverse shock to the credit market. There-
fore, output falls. In the framework of monopoly, the price level falls, leading to higher real
debt burden of the credit-constrained households, which causes the borrowers to reduce
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further their consumption. This Fisherian debt deflation, associated with the subprime
lending, drives the economy to the ZLB more likely. Especially, I show quantitatively that
the Fisherian debt deflation is extremely powerful when the ZLB binds. It generates a
free fall of output and the price level.
The related literature on the ZLB has been inspired by seminal work by Krugman
[1998], which extensively discusses causes and consequences of the ZLB in a series of
simple two-period perfect-foresight models. Since Krugman [1998], extensive research
related to the ZLB has been implemented, including Eggertsson andWoodford [2003], Jung
et al. [2005], Adam and Billi [2006, 2007], Nakov [2008], Levin et al. [2010], Bodenstein
et al. [2010], Eggertsson and Krugman [2010], Werning [2011], Nakata [2011], Fernandez-
Villaverde et al. [2012], and Judd et al. [2011]. These papers use preference shocks as a
reduced form to drive an economy to the liquidity trap with binding ZLB.
In contrast to the above papers that depend on preference shocks to drive an economy
to the liquidity trap with binding ZLB, there are other recent papers dealing with different
types of shocks that make the ZLB to bind. Hall [2011] models excessive capital stock
and a sharp decline in capital utilization as the reason for the nominal interest rate to
be pinned at the ZLB. Curdia and Woodford [2009] model a shock to the wedge between
deposit and lending rates as a driving force.
Guerrieri and Lorenzoni [2011] model a debt limit and household heterogeneity in labor
productivity. They show that an exogenous decline in the debt limit acts as an increase in
the subjective discount factor. The decline in the debt limit causes future consumption to
be more volatile because with a lower debt limit households will be less able to insure their
consumption risks. Therefore, the savers will save more and the borrowers will borrow less
due to precautionary savings. As a result, savings flood the financial market, resulting in
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a sharp decrease in the nominal interest rate, making the ZLB to bind.
Eggertsson and Krugman [2012] also model a debt limit and deleveraging as a key
factor driving the nominal interest rate to the ZLB. In their model, an initial shock to
the debt limit causes borrowers to deleverage by cutting back their consumption, resulting
in a decrease in the price level. This deflation puts more pressure on the real debt the
borrowers have to pay back now, leading to further deleveraging and a sharper decline in
the nominal interest rate. Different from Guerrieri and Lorenzoni [2011] where savings
come from precautionary behavior, Eggertsson and Krugman [2012] model savings based
on the difference in the two types of representative households. One type is patient the
other is not. The patient representative household saves and lends his money to the
impatient one. Similar to Guerrieri and Lorenzoni [2011], they model the debt limit as an
exogenous process.
This paper extends Eggertsson and Krugman [2012] by endogenizing the debt limit
facing the borrowing-constrained households. Specifically, I tie the debt limit to both
exogenous credit market conditions and endogenous market value of collateral assets. More
importantly, the present paper aims at studying the role of a subprime lending market
and an endogenous debt limit in the framework of the ZLB as a transmission mechanism
that can generates a deep recession even under a mild shock to the credit market.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the structure
of the economy. Section 3 shows how key parameters are calibrated to match the U.S.
stylized facts, and reports main results. Section 4 concludes. Appendices are presented in
Section 5.
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2.2 Model
The model is a standard two-representative agent model such as Eggertsson and Krug-
man [2012] and Iacoviello [2005]. There are two types of households: credit-constrained
households (or borrowers) of mass χb, and unconstrained households (or savers) of mass
χs = 1−χb. The borrowers are impatient while the savers are patient and act as the lenders.
The households consume non-housing goods and enjoy housing service from owning houses
that has a fixed supply.
Houses play two roles in the model. First they provide housing services to the house-
holds. Second, they can be used as collateral assets for borrowing. One of the two key
features in our model is an endogenous debt limit that is determined by both endogenous
market value of houses and exogenous financial market conditions (called debt-to-value
ratio), as in Kiyotaki and Moore [1997] and Iacoviello [2005]. The feature distinguishes
this paper from the current literature of deleveraging and the ZLB, where they model debt
limits as an exogenous process, as in Eggertsson and Krugman [2012] and Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni [2011].
2.2.1 Borrowing-constrained household's problem
The representative borrowing-constrained household faces the following problem:
max E
∞∑
t=0
βtbUbt(Cbt, Hbt, Nbt) (2.1)
subject to:
Cbt +Dbt−1 (1 + rt−1) + qt (Hbt −Hbt−1) = (1− τ)wtNbt + Tbt +Dbt (2.2)
Dbt · (1 + rt) ≤ ξtEt [qt+1Hbt] (2.3)
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1 + rt =
1 + it
1 + pit+1
(2.4)
where C,Db, Hb, Nb, T are composite non-housing goods, real debt, housing quantity, labor
supply by the borrower, and lump sum tax/transfer respectively; i, pi, r, q, τ are nominal
interest rate, inflation, real interest rate, real price of house and labor income tax/subsidy;
ξ reflects the credit market conditions. The credit market shock follows an AR(1) process:
ln (ξt+1) = (1− ρξ) ln
(
ξ
)
+ ρξ ln (ξt) + εξ,t+1 (2.5)
Because the parameter ξ is very important in this paper, I would like to clarify two issues
potentially arisen. First, I would interpret the parameter as a debt-to-market value of
collateral asset ratio instead of a loan-to-value ratio at the origination of a mortgage
loan. By studying a debt-to-value ratio, we are able to allow for subprime lending that
results in a substantially high debt-to-income ratio as documented by Mian and Sufi [2011].
Intuitively, this is due to the fact that lenders are willing to lend money based on their
expectation on existing collateral asset appreciation. Second, I am not going to model
why the parameter exists. In this paper, it can be considered as a reduced-form for a
moral hazard problem or irrational expectation problem where the lenders lend money
based on their own expectation that is systemically wrong. Let λbt, φbt be the Lagrange
multipliers with respect to budget constraint and debt constraint. The optimal choices of
the constrained households must satisfy the following conditions:
Ubt,C − λbt = 0 (2.6)
−Ubt,N
Ubt,C
= (1− τ)wt (2.7)
λbt − φbtEt [1 + rt]− βbEt [λbt+1 (1 + rt)] = 0 (2.8)
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Ubt,H + ξtφbtEt [qt+1] + βbEt [λbt+1 · qt+1] = λbtqt (2.9)
min {ξtEt [qt+1Hbt]−Dbt (1 + rt) , φb,t} = 0 (2.10)
φbt ≥ 0 (2.11)
Equation (2.6) shows the marginal utility derived from the composite non-durable con-
sumption goods. Equation (2.7) presents the intra-temporal trade-off between consump-
tion and labor at the margin. Equation (2.8) is the Euler equation for the borrower, which
is the inter-temporal trade-off between today's consumption and tomorrow's consumption.
The sum of the first two terms of the equation is the marginal utility of consuming today,
while the third term is the utility he would receive tomorrow if he did not consume today.
If the credit-constrained household consumes one unit of nondurable goods consumption
he would receive the utility from his consumption. In addition, he will put (1 + rt) pressure
on the collateral constraint, that costs him φbt (1 + rt) in terms of utility.
The marginal trade-off between non-durable goods consumption and durable housing
goods is illustrated in equation (2.9) . The left hand side of the equation shows the marginal
benefit of buying houses, which include housing services, the value of the debt limit in terms
of utility he would get by relaxing the collateral constraint due to owning more houses,
and the next period value of the houses. The right hand side of the equation shows the
marginal cost of buying houses. The borrowing constraint is written in equation (2.10) .
This equation is the combination of the collateral constraint and the non-negativity of the
shadow value of debt, φbt.
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2.2.2 Unconstrained household's problem
The representative unconstrained household never faces a borrowing constraint. He saves
and lends to the credit-constrained households. He also owns intermediate-goods produc-
ers. His problem is as follows.
max E
∞∑
t=0
βtsUst (Cst, Hst, Nst) (2.12)
subject to:
Cst +Dst−1 (1 + rt−1) + qt (Hst −Hst−1) = (1− τ)wtNst +
∫ 1
i=0
Zit
Pt
di+ Tst +Dst (2.13)
where C,Ds, Hs, Nb, T are composite non-housing goods, real debt, housing quantity, la-
bor supply and lump sum tax/transfer respectively; i, pi, r, q, τ are nominal interest rate,
inflation, real interest rate, real price of house and labor income tax/subsidy; Z is nominal
profit from the intermediate-goods firms that are owned by the savers only.
Let λst be the Lagrange multiplier with respect to the budget constraint of the the
saver. The optimal choices of the saver must satisfy the following condition:
Ust,C − λst = 0 (2.14)
−Ust,N
Ust,C
= (1− τ)wt (2.15)
λst − βsEt [λst+1 (1 + rt)] = 0 (2.16)
Ust,H + βsEt [λst+1 · qt+1] = λstqt (2.17)
Equation (2.14) shows the saver's marginal utility derived from the composite non-
durable consumption goods. Equation (2.15) presents his marginal trade-off between con-
sumption and labor. Equation (2.16) is the Euler equation for the saver, which is the
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intertemporal trade-off between today's consumption and tomorrow's consumption. The
marginal trade-off between non-durable goods consumption and housing goods is illus-
trated in equation (2.17) .
2.2.3 Final goods producer
The final goods producer operates in the perfectly competitive market. He produces the
consumption goods by aggregating a variety of differentiated goods using a CES technol-
ogy. His problem is to maximize his contemporaneous profit.
maxPtYt −
∫
Pt (i)Yt (i) di (2.18)
subject to
Yt =
(∫ 1
0
Yt (i)
−1
 di
) 
−1
(2.19)
where yit is the input of intermediate goods i ∈ [0, 1] and ε is the elasticity of substitution
between differentiated goods.
The optimal decision of the final goods producer gives rise to the demand for the
intermediate goods i :
Yt (i) =
(
Pt (i)
Pt
)−
Yt (2.20)
where Pt is the price index:
Pt =
(∫
Pt (i)
1− di
) 1
1−
(2.21)
2.2.4 Intermediate goods producers
There is a mass 1 of intermediate goods firms. These firms are owned by the savers and
are operated in a monopolistically competitive market. A firm's objective is to maximize
its total present discounted flows of profits. The firms adjust their prices according to a
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quadratic adjustment cost of Rotemberg's type. Firm i's problem is given below:
max
Pit,Nit
Eit
∞∑
j=0
Qst,t+jZit+j (2.22)
subject to
Zit = PitYit − PtwtNit − Pt
ϕ
2
(
Pit
Pit−1
− 1
)2
Yt (2.23)
Yit = AtNit (2.24)
Yit =
(
Pit
Pt
)−ε
Yt (2.25)
Pi0 = P0 (2.26)
where At presents technology shocks that follow an AR(1) process:
ln (At+1) = ρA ln (At) + εA,t+1 (2.27)
The optimality conditions give rise to the following condition:
(
1− ε+ εwt
At
− ϕpit (1 + pit)
)
Yt + ϕQst,t+1Et
[
pit+1 (1 + pit+1)
2 Yt+1
]
= 0 (2.28)
where
Qst,t+1 = βs
Ust+1,C
Ust,C
1
(1 + pit+1)
(2.29)
is the stochastic discount factor.
2.2.5 Aggregate conditions
In equilibrium, all markets are cleared:
χbHbt + χsHst = H (2.30)
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χbCbt + χsCst = Ct (2.31)
χbNbt + χsNst = Nt (2.32)
χbDbt + χsDst = Bgt (2.33)
Ct = Yt =
AtNt
∆t
(2.34)
∆t =
∫ (
Pit
Pt
)−ε
di (2.35)
Equation (2.30) shows that the total demand for houses equals the total fixed housing
supply. Equation (2.34) , (2.32) , (2.33) present market clearing conditions for the non-
housing composite goods, labor, and debt markets respectively.
2.2.6 Government policy
Monetary policy: The central bank conducts monetary policy using a simple Taylor
rule as following:
(
1 + it
1 + i
)
=
(
1 + it−1
1 + i
)φi (1 + pit
1 + pi
)φpi
(2.36)
it ≥ 0 (2.37)
Fiscal policy: The government collects labor income taxes and issues a fixed quantity
of short-term government bonds to cover lump sum transfers to households.
χbTbt + χsTst = τ (χbNbt + χbNst)wt +Bgt (2.38)
2.2.7 Equilibrium
An equilibrium consists the path of allocation {Hbt, Dbt, Cbt, Nbt, Tbt, Hst, Dst, Cst, Nst, Tst, Ct, Nt, Yt}
and prices {it, wt, pit} satisfying the following conditions:
(1) Borrowers' and savers' optimization conditions.
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(2) Firms's optimization conditions.
(3) Aggregate conditions.
(4) Taylor rule and the ZLB.
(5) Balanced government budget.
2.3 Results: a two-period deleveraging model
In this section, I work with a simple two-period deleveraging model. The timing of the
model is similar to the one in Eggertsson and Krugman [2012]. Initially, at time 0, the
economy stands at a steady state with a certain credit market condition
(
ξ = ξ
)
. Then a
permanent shock to the credit market occurs (ξ changes to ξ′) at time 1. The representative
households choose new debt, housing quantity, nondurable consumption goods, and labor.
The economy converges to a new steady state at time 2.
2.3.1 Calibration
The preferences for the borrowers and savers are as below:
Ubt = lnCbt + jb lnHbt − ηb
N1+φbt
1 + φ
Ust = lnCst + js lnHst − ηsN
1+φ
st
1 + φ
The key parameters are calibrated in Table 2.1. The fraction of borrowers is 0.58.
Subjective discount factors are 0.99 and 0.96 for the borrower and saver respectively. These
numbers are taken directly from Iacoviello [2005]. In this economy, 58% of households are
credit constrained. The fixed stock of housing supply are normalized to 1. I calibrate
three parameters ξ, js, and jb to match three stylized facts that we observed in the U.S.
economy. First, the total debt to income ratio is from 1.8 to 2.5, as reported in Mian and
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Sufi [2011]. Second, the total housing asset to income ratio is around 4, as in the flow
of funds table reported by the Federal Reserve Bank. Third, on average, each household
owns a house, or Hb/Hs is 1. The calibration results in a debt-to-value ratio as high as
0.95, which is higher than 0.89 estimated in Iacoviello [2005].
I calibrate ηb and ηs to be 1.04 and 0.76 respectively in order to have the initial steady
state labor of 1 for both the borrowers and savers. The inverse labor supply elasticity,
φ, is chosen to be 1. The demand elasticity for differentiated goods is calibrated to be
20, corresponding to a net markup of 5%; labor income tax, τ, is chose to be 0. In other
words, the only non-trivial economic distortion in the economy is due to the monopoly
power. The adjustment cost parameter (ψ) is calibrated to be 150, corresponding to the
average duration of about 3.3 quarters without having prices changed. For the Taylor rule,
I choose the inflation target to be zero. The weight of inflation and past interest rates are
2.5 and 0 respectively.
2.3.2 Without the ZLB
To understand the role of the ZLB in the following section, in this section I first provide
the results from the case without the ZLB, as presented in Figure 2.1 and 2.2. The x-
axis shows a permanent percentage change of the credit market parameter (ξ) from the
initial steady state value. The short-run responses of selected macro economic variables
in period 1 are presented in the y-axes. The solid blue lines present the results from the
housing model while the dashed red lines show the results from the EK model. By the
EK model, I fix the housing price and housing quantities for both the borrowers and the
savers. Panel D of Figure 2.1, Panel A, C and D of Figure 2.2 show the percentage change
of total output, new debt, housing quantity of the borrowers, and housing price from the
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Table 2.1: Benchmark parameters
Parameter Value Note Source
χb 0.58 Fraction of borrowers Iacoviello [2005]
χs 0.42 Fraction of savers Iacoviello [2005]
βs 0.99 Subjective discount of savers Iacoviello [2005]
βb 0.96 Subjective discount of borrowers Iacoviello [2005]
H 1 Fixed stock of housing supply Normalized
ξ 0.95 Calibrated to match χbDb/Y = 2.2 Mian and Sufi [2011]
js 0.038 Calibrated to match Hb/Hs = 1
jb 0.049 Calibrated to match qH/Y = 4 Flow of funds table
ηb 1.04 Borrowers' labor disutility parameter To calibrate SS Nb = 1
ηs 0.76 Savers' labor disutility parameter To calibrate SS Ns = 1
φ 1 Inverse labor supply elasticity
ψ 150 Keeping prices unchanged for
about 3.3 quarters on average
ε 20 Markup is 5%
τ 0 Labor income tax
pi 0 Target inflation rate
φpi 2.5 Weight of inflation in Taylor rule
φι 0 Weight of last period interest rate
Note: The flow of funds table is from the Federal Reserve Bank.
initial steady state values respectively. Panel B of Figure 2.2 shows debt service as the
percentage of the initial debt, where debt service is computed as debt payment minus
new debt. Under a positive shock to the debt-to-value ratio, from Figure 2.1 and 2.1.,
we see that, in the housing model, the value of debt limit and debt service decline, while
borrowers' new debt and new housing quantity, total output, inflation, and interest rates
all increase. Intuitively, when the debt-to-value ratio increases, the debt limit faced by
the borrowers increases and they are allowed to borrow more given the other factors. As
a result, the shadow value of debt limit decreases and the borrowers would like to borrow
more in the equilibrium. Hence, both borrowers' nondurable and housing consumption
increase. The increase in the housing quantity leads to a higher debt limit, encouraging
the borrowers to borrow and spend more, creating another round of expansion. Debt
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Figure 2.1: Responses of macro economic variables, the case without the ZLB.
service declines because the borrowers are not only able to roll over their debts and but
also able to borrow more. In the monopolistic framework, inflation is also rising when
output increases. Under a simple Taylor rule, we see a rise in the nominal interest rate.
Note that when inflation rises, there is a real transfer from the lenders to the borrowers,
the wealth effect also causes the borrowers to spend more. We will see the debt deflation
effect in the next section.
However, up to a point, a further increase in the debt-to-value ratio would not alter
the responses of macro economic variables. After the point, the borrowers are allowed
to borrow up to the amount they want. In other words, they no longer face a credit
constraint. Therefore, the shadow value of debt limit is zero. The borrowers no longer
accumulate more houses to lift up their potential debt limit. The inflation and nominal
interest rate hit the upper bounds of around 1% and 6.8% per years respectively.
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Figure 2.2: Responses of macro economic variables, the case without the ZLB. (cont.)
The opposite mechanism occurs under a negative shock to the credit market. In this
circumstance, the borrowers are not able to borrow as much as before given the other
factors. Debt limit decreases, while the shadow value of debt limit rises. Therefore, new
debt falls, leading to a higher debt service. As a result, the borrowers' nondurable and
housing consumption fall. The interest rate declines. Because the monetary policy is
just a simple Taylor rule, it is not powerful enough to stabilize output and inflation. So,
output declines and, as a result, deflation occurs. The responses are also amplified by the
collateral effect and debt deflation effect.
The much more interesting and important feature is that the model with housing
generates more amplified responses of macroeconomic variables under a shock. Let us
look at the scenario under a negative shock. Panel A in Figure 2.1 shows that the nominal
interest rate in the housing model falls more than in the EK model. Also, the housing
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model produces a bigger decline in inflation and output, as in Panel B and D in Figure 1.
The borrowers suffer a tighter collateral constraint in the housing model than in the EK
model because the shadow value of debt limit is higher in the housing model than in the
EK model.
The more amplified transmission mechanism of the housing model can be found only
when we allow for subprime lending. As explained above, by subprime lending, I calibrate
the parameter ξ to match the debt-to-income ratio at the onset of the housing bubble
burst. The ratio is substantially high, around 2.2. Without the subprime lending, we
cannot generate such results.
To demonstrate the role of subprime lending, I report results in the case of prime
lending and without the ZLB in Figure 2.3 and 2.4. In the prime lending case, I calibrate
the initial debt-to-value of collateral asset to match with a lower debt-to-income ratio,
which is 1.8 instead of 2.2 as in the benchmark. The corresponding debt-to-value of
collateral asset ratio is around 0.77, which is much smaller than 0.95 as in the case of
subprime lending. As in Panel A, Figure 2.3, under a negative demand shock, the decrease
in the nominal interest rate in the housing model is not as big as in the EK model. Also,
inflation and output fall less in the housing model than in the EK model. Although, we see
a higher debt service and a smaller new debt in the housing model, the value of debt limit
is actually smaller in the housing model. This means that the slackness of the collateral
constraint is smaller in the housing model.
The intuition for the more amplified responses of the housing model with a subprime
lending is as follows. When there is an adverse shock to the financial market conditions,
the debt limit of the borrowers declines. They have to cut back either nondurable or
durable housing goods consumption. In general, through the budget constraint (2.2) , a
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Figure 2.3: Responses of macro economic variables, the case of prime lending and without
the ZLB.
Figure 2.4: Responses of macro economic variables, the case of prime lending and without
the ZLB. (cont.)
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dollar decrease in durable goods consumption would help to lower the current debt by a
dollar. As a result, from the collateral constraint (2.3) , the reduction relaxes the collateral
constraint by Rt dollar, where Rt is the gross real interest rate. However, reducing 1 dollar
of durable housing consumption, the borrowers have to give up the utility from housing
service. More importantly, reducing 1 dollar of durable goods will lead to a fall of the
debt limit, which depends on the expected housing price and financial market conditions,
as in equation (2.2). In an exogenous debt limit model, such as the EK model, the cost
of putting an additional pressure on the collateral constraint does not exit. Therefore, in
their model, a sharp decline in durable goods would occur.
In the model with subprime lending, the initial debt-to-value is high. Therefore, it is
costly to cut durable housing goods because it will put more pressure on the collateral
constraint. In this case, the borrowers do not want to cut back durable housing consump-
tion. However, because the durable and non-durable goods are not perfectly substitutable,
the durable goods must be reduced when the nondurable goods consumption is cut back.
The reduction in durable housing consumption leads to a further decline in the debt limit,
and, as a result, a further decline in non-durable and durable goods consumption. This
mechanism creates a spiral cut in durable housing quantity and the debt limit tying to it.
2.3.3 With ZLB
In this section, I study the impact of an adverse shock to the credit market in the case
of subprime lending and in the presence of the ZLB. The results are presented in Figure
2.5 and 2.6. Again, the solid blue lines present the results from the housing model while
the dashed red lines show the results from the EK model. The transmission mechanism
is powerful when the ZLB binds. The total output in the economy drops drastically
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Figure 2.5: Responses of macro economic variables, the case with subprime lending and
the ZLB.
under a shock that causes the ZLB binding. We can see the discontinuity of the short-
run equilibrium output in Panel D of Figure 2.6. At the point where the ZLB binds,
output falls 1.7% more, from around −1.4% per quarter to −3.1% per quarter, or around
-12quarter.
The free fall in output and inflation result from two main channels. First, from the
collateral constraint equation (2.3), when there is an adverse shock to the credit market
conditions, ξt, both it and Dbt fall. When the ZLB binds, more downward pressure will
be put on the current debt. In other words, a binding ZLB amplifies the collateral effect.
Second, from the budget constraint to the borrowers, the real debt burden increases sub-
stantially due to the rise of deflation. Together with the binding ZLB, it creates a very
powerful amplification mechanism.
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Figure 2.6: Responses of macro economic variables, the case with subprime lending and
the ZLB. (cont.)
To see the powerful Fisherian debt deflation, I provide a comparison between the
model with and without Fisherian debt deflation channel in Figure 2.7 and 2.8. In the
case without Fisherian debt deflation, the nominal interest rates are indexed by inflation.
Therefore, in this case, the real debt is constant no matter how large deflation is. The solid
blue lines show the results from the model with Fisherian debt deflation, while the dashed
red lines present the results from the model without Fisherian debt deflation. Including
the Fisherian debt deflation not only makes the ZLB to bind more easily, as in Panel A
of Figure 2.7, but also make a recession much worse when the ZLB binds, as in Panel B
of Figure 2.7.
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Figure 2.7: Responses of macro economic variables, the case with subprime lending and
the ZLB.
Figure 2.8: Responses of macro economic variables, the case with subprime lending and
the ZLB. (cont.)
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2.4 Conclusion
I have already shown that including subprime lending and endogenizing the debt limit help
to generate a powerful mechanism that transmits a credit shock to a deep recession. The
model capturing these features can generate more amplified responses of macro economic
variables than the standard deleveraging EKmodel or the model without subprime lending.
With these features, the ZLB is more likely to bind in the housing model than in the EK
model. When it binds, a great recession emerges, mostly due to the reinforcement between
the increase in the real debt burden faced by the credit-constrained households and the
fall of the endogenous debt limit due to deleveraging.
There are several directions to extend the paper. First, it is natural to allow for
dynamic transition instead of two-period modeling. Second, it would be interesting to
extend the model by allowing for occasionally binding ZLB instead of assuming perfect
foresight as done in this paper. Third, we can investigate different monetary policy regimes
instead of a simple Taylor rule. By doing so, we might answer how an optimal monetary
policy would be implemented given a debt situation. Eventually, it is interesting to see
what kind of fiscal policy would be the best in the case where the ZLB binds.
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2.5 Appendices: Chapter 2
2.5.1 Equilibrium equations
We obtain the system of equations governing the equilibrium of the model as follows:
Cbt +Dbt−1
(
1 + it−1
1 + pit
)
+ qt (Hbt −Hbt−1)− wtNbt −Dbt = 0 (2.39)
ηbN
φ
bt
C−γbt
− (1− τ)wt = 0 (2.40)
C−γbt − φbt (1 + it)Et
[
1
1 + pit+1
]
− βb (1 + it)Et
[
C−γbt+1
1 + pit+1
]
= 0 (2.41)
jbH
−ψ
bt + ξtφbtEt [qt+1] + βbEt
[
C−γbt+1qt+1
]
− C−γbt qt = 0 (2.42)
max
{
−ξtHbtEt [qt+1] +Dbt (1 + it)Et
(
1
1 + pit+1
)
, 0− φbt
}
= 0 (2.43)
Cst − χbDbt−1
χs
(
1 + it−1
1 + pit
)
− qtχb
χs
(Hbt −Hbt−1) ...
− 1
χs
(
Yt − wtχbNbt − ϕ
2
(Πt − 1)2 Yt
)
+
χbDbt
χs
= 0 (2.44)
ηsN
φ
st
C−γst
− (1− τ)wt = 0 (2.45)
C−γst − βs (1 + it)Et
[
C−γst+1
1 + pit+1
]
= 0 (2.46)
js
(
H − χbHbt
χs
)−ψ
+ βsEt
[
C−γst+1qt+1
]
− C−γst qt = 0 (2.47)(
1− ε+ εwt
At
− ϕpit (1 + pit)
)
Yt + ϕβsC
γ
stEt
[
pit+1 (1 + pit+1)Yt+1
Cγst+1
]
= 0 (2.48)
χbNbt + χsNst − Yt = 0 (2.49)
max
{
(1 + i)
(
1 + it−1
1 + i
)φi (1 + pit
1 + pi
)φpi
− (1 + it), 0− it
}
= 0 (2.50)
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2.5.2 Steady state
Cb = wNb − rDb
ηbN
φ
b
C−γb
= (1− τ)w
C−γb − φbR− βbC−γb R = 0
jbH
−ψ
b + ξφbq + βbC
−γ
b q = C
−γ
b q
ξqHb −DbR = 0
Cs =
1
χs
(Y − χbwNb) + χb
χs
rDb
ηsN
φ
s
C−γs
= (1− τ)w
R =
1
βs
js
(
H − χbHb
χs
)−ψ
+ βsC
−γ
s q = C
−γ
s q
w =
ε− 1
ε
χbNb + χsNs = Y
or
Π = 1
Nb = Ns = N
∗ = 1 = Y
R =
1
βs
w =
ε− 1
ε
Auxiliary equations:
ηbN
φ
b
(1− τ)w = C
−γ
b
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ηsN
φ
s
(1− τ)w = C
−γ
s
ηs
ηb
=
(
Cs
Cb
)−γ
, calibrate ηs, ηb accordingly
φb = C
−γ
b (βs − βb)
Db =
ξqHb
R
Cb = wNb − (1− βs) ξqHb
Cs =
1
χs
Y (1− χbw) + χb
χs
(1− βs) ξqHb
Core equations:
jbH
−ψ
b = C
−γ
b q (1− ξ (βs − βb)− βb)(
H − χbHb
χs
)−ψ
=
C−γs q (1− βs)
js
Calibrate ψ = 1 = γ, the core equations become:
Hb =
jb (wNb − (1− βs) ξqHb)
q (1− ξ (βs − βb)− βb)
qHb =
jb (wNb)
jb (1− βs) ξ + (1− ξ (βs − βb)− βb) ηb
(
H − χbHb
χsjs
)
=
1
χs
Y (1− χbw) + χbχs (1− βs) ξqHb
ηsq (1− βs)
H − χbHb = jsY (1− χbw) + jsχb (1− βs) ξqHb
ηsq (1− βs)
qHb =
Hq (1− βs) ηs − jsY (1− χbw)
(1− βs) jsχbξ + (1− βs)χbηs
q =
jb (wNb)
(
js
ηs
ξ + 1
)
χb
Hjb (1− βs) ξ +H (1− ξ (βs − βb)− βb) ηb
+
js
ηs
Y (1− χbw)
(1− βs)H
Note that we calibrate ξ, jb and js to match the total debt to income ratio of 2.2, such
as Mian and Sufi [2011], to match the total housing asset to income ratio of about 4, as in
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the flow of funds table, and to match the saver's housing to borrower's housing ratio of 1.
ξ =
(
χbDb
Y
)
R
χb
(
qH
Y
)(
Hb
H
)
jb =
(
Hb
H
)(
qH
Y
)
(1− ξβs − βb (1− ξ)) ηb
w − (1− βs) ξ
(
Hb
H
)(
qH
Y
)
js
ηs
=
(1− βs)−
(
Hb
H
)
(1− βs)χb(
Y
Hq
)
(1− χbw) +
(
Hb
H
)
(1− βs)χbξ
where
Hb
H
=
1
χb + χs
(
Hs
Hb
)
ηs = is calibrated w.r.t λs
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Chapter 3
Habit Formation in State-Dependent Pricing
Models Implications for the Dynamics of Output
and Prices
3.1 Introduction
New-Keynesian economists argue that prices are sticky and that the stickiness comes from
demand side factors such as tastes and preferences of consumers, and from supply side
factors such as sticky marginal cost and direct barriers to price adjustments. Due to price
stickiness, a monetary shock would have significant impacts on real output and inflation,
leading to the role of monetary policy in stabilizing the economy in the short run. Finding
the true internal propagation mechanism of monetary policy through firm-level pricing
behavior is crucial for New-Keynesian economists.
The literature that models price adjustment is divided into two branches: one is based
on the time-dependent pricing (TDP) framework and the other is based on state-dependent
pricing (SDP) models. In the TDP pricing framework, an exogenous proportion of firms
adjust their prices each period no matter what the economy is doing. Unlike TDP models,
SDP models argue that timing to adjust price and magnitude of price adjustment are
endogenous and based on the state of an economy. Whenever the opportunity cost of not
changing prices is greater than the adjustment cost, firms will adjust prices. The SDP
models rationalize the fact that during a high-inflation period price adjustment is more
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frequent than during a low inflation period. Also, this methodology was shown to have
different implications for the dynamics of output and inflation compared to TDP models.1
Since the paper by Dotsey et al. [1999], a body of research in modeling money distur-
bances has been developed using the framework of SDP and dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium (DSGE) models due to the new tractable algorithms and improved computing
power. However, like its counterpart - the TDP model - the output and inflation responses
to monetary shocks produced by the original SDP model are not satisfactory because they
are either transient or not hump-shaped. These results are referred to the well known per-
sistence problem in macro and monetary economics because they are not consistent with
the stylized facts found by Vector Auto-Regression (VAR) studies, where output response
peaks at about 4 to 6 quarters and dies out gradually after 12 quarters, while inflation
peaks after about 8 quarters and deviates from the steady state for about 16 quarters.23
A recent paper that has attracted much attention is Golosov and Lucas [2007]. They
developed a menu cost model with idiosyncratic technology shocks in the framework of
SDP and DSGE. Golosov and Lucas [2007] calibrated their model to match the empirical
findings of U.S. micro data due to Bils and Klenow [2005], including an average annual in-
flation of 2.5%, average price adjustment rate of 21.9% per month, and mean and standard
deviation of price increase conditional on price changes of 9.5% and 8.7%. By simulat-
ing the calibrated model, they found that a monetary shock has a transient impact on
output and the relationship between inflation and output is very weak and insignificant.
Specifically, a 1% positive shock of money supply raises output by only 0.05%.
1Sheshinski and Weiss [1983], Caplin and Spulberg [1987], Caplin and Leahy [1991]
2The assumptions used to estimate VAR models are still debatable, see Christiano et al. [1999, 2005],
Bouakez et al. [2005]
3This means that the price level is persistent and that it deviates from the steady state about 16
quarters.
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The explanation of their results comes from the so-called selection effect, where most
firms that want to increase prices due to monetary expansion suffer negative technology,
which leads to an increase in marginal cost, forcing a larger price raise, while those who
would decrease prices due to positive technology shocks decide to wait. Therefore, the
aggregate price level is more responsive to nominal shocks. Another reason comes from an
important assumption that the utility function is conventionally time separable. Though
anticipating the importance of a time non-separable utility function, Golosov and Lucas
[2007] did not use such a function. Like other standard state-dependent pricing models,
the Golosov and Lucas [2007] paper did not produce the hump-shaped responses of output
to a monetary shock that the empirical evidence leads us to expect.
In this paper, I introduce new real rigidity into the framework of SDP aimed at produc-
ing new results that match with the stylized facts. My basic model is based on the Dotsey
et al. [1999], thereafter called the DKW model or conventional SDP model. However, my
model is different from the original DKW model and other extant SDP models in that the
utility function of the representative household is time non-separable, incorporating habit
formation or additive consumption. With habit formation, happiness or utility depends
on both the current level of consumption and an exponentially-weighted index of past
consumptions. High consumption levels in the recent past imply lower utility from a given
current consumption.
While this paper focuses on the demand side, most of the previous SDP literature
has focused on the supply side. The only paper working with demand side factors is?,
where they explored the role of variable demand elasticity. This special demand feature
makes firms be less aggressive in raising prices. Including the feature can produce more
satisfactory response of output but not inflation. The recent literature that aimed at
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solving persistence problem and that focused on supply side include Gertler and Leahy
[2005], Dotsey et al. [2006] and Burstein [2006].
Burstein [2006] extended the original DKW model by introducing sticky planned or
predetermined prices, where, when adjusting their prices, firms not only choose an optimal
price for the current state but also select a sequence of future prices contingent on the
information set available at the current state. Thought the results are more realistic
than those from the conventional SDP and TDP models, they are still far from the same
as the stylized facts. In the planned price model, inflation response is hump-shaped but
not persistent. It peaks after one period and reverts to the steady state after about 5
quarters. Output response is not hump-shape and persistent. The impact response of
output is jumpy too.
Gertler and Leahy [2005] and Dotsey et al. [2006] proved that including idiosyncratic
technology shocks creates more price stickiness because firms adjustment decisions are
less responsive to aggregate developments. Though Dotsey et al. [2006] was able to show
that with idiosyncratic technology shocks the dynamic responses of output and inflation
are less jumpy and more realistic compared to those from the conventional SDP model
specified in Dotsey and King [2005], they are still different from the stylized facts.
Other SDP models including Midrigan [2006] and Burstein and Hellwig [2006] have
concentrated on the supply side. Introducing economies of scale in the technology of
adjusting prices, Midrigan [2006] found that the model could generate aggregate fluctua-
tions much larger than the model of Golosov and Lucas because of the reduction in the
"selection effect".
Burstein and Hellwig [2006] studied another real rigidity called pricing complemen-
tarities, which reduces a firm's response to nominal shocks if the firm expects that some
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other firms do not respond immediately, in the context of a menu cost model and SDP
framework. They presented decreasing returns to scale as firm-level of pricing complemen-
tarities into the model of Golosov and Lucas [2007]. However, they calibrated the model
not only on the basis of moments of prices, as Golosov and Lucas [2007] did, but also the
moments of market shares and prices, and the asymmetry of responses to inflation and
deflation. They found a moderate level of pricing complementarities, but they appear to
be too weak to generate much larger aggregate real effects from nominal shocks than a
model without pricing complementarities.
Therefore, the existing literature on SDP fails to produce the results that match with
the stylized facts in macro and monetary economics. Caballero and Engel [2007] demon-
strated that any model with (S,s) pricing behaviors can generate additional flexibility of
price level as long as the hazard rate of price adjustment is increasing over time. The
findings by Caballero and Engel [2007] and current literature on SDP models proves that
in order to match with the stylized facts we need other real rigidities. However, John-
ston [2007] showed that including firm specific capital could not produce the satisfactory
results.
In my model I introduce an aggregate real rigidities called habit formation. There is
a large body of theoretical and empirical research in macroeconomics about habit forma-
tion.4 Also, habit formation has been applied extensively in asset pricing, economic growth
and monetary economics using the TDP pricing framework.5 Incorporating habit forma-
tion makes the aggregate consumption smoother and more inertial because the front-
4Durham and Dale [1991], Ni [1993], Chapman [1998], Dynan [2000] and Sommer [2007].
5See Fuhrer [2000]; Christiano et al. [2005]; Bouakez et al. [2005]; Olivei and Tenreyro [2007] for
modeling habit formation in the time-dependent pricing framework.
See Abel [1990], Constantinides [1990], Jermann [1998], Campbell and Cochrane [1999] for modeling habit
formation in asset pricing models to solve the equity premium puzzle.
See Carroll et al. [2000] for modeling habit formation to solve the growth-saving problem.
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loading behavior of consumers is reduced, causing output and other macro variables to
become more persistent and hump-shaped in a way that more closely matches the stylized
facts.
My model can be related to recent TDP models that adopts habit persistence to match
the stylized facts.6 However, my model is different from those models in that it is placed
in the SDP framework instead of the TDP framework. Therefore, the implication of the
dynamics of output and inflation in my model are different from the TDP models.
With a moderate habit formation I am able to show that the responses of output and
inflation to monetary shock in my model are entirely different from those coming from the
original DKW model and other extant SDP models. The impact responses of output and
consumption are significantly reduced. At the time of 1% moderately persistent money
growth shock, the output increases by only 0.25% compared to 0.45% in the original DKW
model. The output peaks after 2 quarters at about 0.3% before going back to the steady
state level. Also, with habit formation, the responses of output and inflation are much
more persistent compared with those in the DKW model. The output comes back to
the steady state after 12 quarters compared to 4 quarters in the DKW model. More
importantly, the output response is hump-shaped unlike in the conventional SDP models.
This paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the model with habit formation.
Sections 3 and 4 report the steady state results and the dynamics of output and price level
under different types of monetary shocks. Section 5 concludes and suggests some ways to
extend the model in future work.
6Fuhrer [2000], Bouakez et al. [2005], Christiano et al. [2005], Olivei and Tenreyro [2007].
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3.2 Model
My basic model is based on the original DKW SDP model. The representative household
supplies labor and capital in competitive markets, and buys final aggregate consumption
goods being produced by the final goods producer from a continuum of differentiated
intermediate goods indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. These intermediate goods are produced by a
continuum of intermediate firms indexed by i ∈ [0, 1]. The intermediate firms are buyers of
production factors in competitive markets and are monopolistically competitive suppliers
of differentiated intermediate goods. Each firm produces one good and is required to
satisfy all demand at its posted price.
3.2.1 Households
The representative household maximizes its present value of lifetime utility:
Max
{ct,Nt}
E0
∞∑
t=1
βt ·
[
(ct − zt)1−σ
1− σ −
χ
1 + φ
·N1+φt
]
, (3.1)
subject to the budget constraint:
Pt · ct +Bt = Pt · wt ·Nt + (1 +Rt) ·Bt−1 + Pt · qt · k + Πt, (3.2)
where zt is habit stock or the past consumption index that is exponentially-weighted past
consumptions in the following form:
zt =
∞∑
s=1
κs · ct−s, (3.3)
and ct and Nt are aggregate consumption and total labor at time t respectively, φ
−1 is the
labor supply elasticity, χ is a disutility parameter of working, κ represents the importance
of past consumption, Bt−1 denotes the household's holdings of nominal bonds at the
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beginning of period t, Bt and Πt denote nominal bonds hold at the end of period t and
nominal profit, while wt and qt denote the real wage and rental rate for labor and capital
respectively. In order to isolate the impacts of costly capital adjustment and to compare
with the original DKW model, I assume that there is no capital accumulation. In other
word, kt = kt+1 and the depreciation rate is 0. Rt and Pt are the interest rate on bonds
and price level at period t. The budget constraint can be written in real term as following:
ct + bt = wt ·Nt + (1 + rt) · bt−1 + qt · k + pit, (3.4)
where b and pi are real bonds and profit, rt is the real interest rate and (1 + rt) = (1 +
Rt) · Pt−1Pt .
This utility function is different from the functions that have been used in the extant
SDP models including Dotsey et al. [1999], King and Wolman [2004], Burstein [2006], and
Golosov and Lucas [2007] in that it is no longer time separable. The utility function with
habit formation follows those of Constantinides [1990] and Jermann [1998]. This time
non-separable utility function is a simple version of the so-called additive or intrinsic
habit formation utility function.
To be consistent with the empirical literature of habit formation, in this paper the
habit stock zt = κ · ct−1, and households put an importance only on the most recent
consumption. Parameter κ represents the importance of the past consumption or habit.
If κ is zero, the utility function will collapse into the traditional time separable one. The
greater the κ is, the more important the habit. It is obvious that a high level of past
consumption implies, ceteris paribus, lower utility given a current consumption level.
Incorporating the habit formation has a very important role in reducing "front-loading"
behavior of consumers, meaning that there would be smaller changes in consumption and
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output when there was a shock to the economy.
The representative household maximizes the present value of life time utility, giving
the optimal choices of aggregate consumption, labor supply and Euler equation:
(ct − κ · ct−1)−σ − β · κ · Et(ct+1 − κ · ct)−σ = λt , (3.5)
χ ·Nφt = λt · wt, (3.6)
λt = β · Et(1 + rt+1) · λt+1. (3.7)
Muellbauer (1988) proved that the Euler equation can be approximated by the follow-
ing equation:
∆ ln(ct) = κ0 + κ ·∆ ln(ct−1) + εt
This equation is considered as a workhorse in testing for habit formation empirically
using household data.7 If κ is statistically significant, there exists habit formation.
3.2.2 Final goods producer
The aggregate consumption good entering representative agent's utility is a Dixit-Stiglitz
aggregate of many individual goods according to the following CES function:
ct =
 1∫
0
y
(−1)/ε
it · di
/(−1) , (3.8)
where yit is the input of intermediate good i ∈ [0, 1] and  > 0 is the elasticity of sub-
stitution between differentiated goods. As  → ∞, intermediate goods become perfect
substitutes in production because ct =
∫ 1
0 yit · di. This aggregate consumption good is
7See Durham and Dale [1991], Ni [1993], Dynan [2000], Sommer [2007]
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produced by the final-good producer who solves the static problem:
Max
{yit}
Pt · ct −
1∫
0
Pit · yit · di
 , (3.9)
subject to ct =
 1∫
0
y
(−1)/ε
it · di
/(−1) .
The final goods producer solves its zero profit problem because intrinsically the final
goods producer is the same the representative household, providing the input demand for
good i:
yit = (Pit/Pt)
− · ct, (3.10)
where the elasticity of demand is . The zero-profit condition implies that the aggregate
price index is given by:
Pt =
 1∫
0
P
(1−)
it di
1/(1−) . (3.11)
3.2.3 Intermediate goods producers
Each firm produces a differentiated intermediate good according to a standard Cobb-
Douglass production function using capital and labor:
yit = At · k1−γit · nγit, (3.12)
where At is the common technology, γ ∈ (0, 1) is the share of labor in the production
of good i, and kit and nit are capital and labor used by firm i at time t. The following
cost-minimization problem determines the demands for labor and capital inputs:
Min
{nit,kit}
(wt · nit + qt · kit) , (3.13)
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subject to At · k1−γit · nγit = yit,
where qt and wt are the economy-wide real capital rental rate and real wage respectively.
The intermediate good producers solve the cost minimization problem, giving the op-
timal choices of labor and capital indicated in the following equations:
wt = ψt · γ · [yit/nit] , (3.14)
qt = ψt · (1− γ) · [yit/kit] , (3.15)
where ψt is the real marginal cost or the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint.
From these equations, and because the technology is in common all firms must have the
same capital/labor ratio. This fact will be utilized to solve for the steady state of the
economy later.
Intermediate goods producers are monopolistically competitive. Each firm faces the
downward sloping demand curve given from the final goods producer's problem. The total
production from all firms is yt =
∫ 1
0 yit ·di that is different from the final goods production
ct =
[∫ 1
0 y
(−1)/ε
it · di
]/(−1)
:
yt = At · k1−γt · nγt =
∫ 1
0
yit · di =
(
Pt
P¯t
)
· ct, (3.16)
where kt =
∫ 1
0 kit · di and nt =
∫ 1
0 nit · di.
If we define an auxiliary price index as following:
P¯t =
 1∫
0j
P−it · di

−1/
, (3.17)
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then we can prove the following relationship:
yt =
(
Pt
P¯t
)
· ct. (3.18)
3.2.4 Optimal pricing adjustment
An intermediate firm is characterized by its vintage j = (1..J), which means that it last
changed its price j periods ago. The number of vintages J is determined endogenously.
Suppose that there is a relative frequency distribution of firms where θj,t is the fraction of
firms of vintage j and
∑J
j=1 θj,t = 1. At time t, suppose that a fraction αj,t of vintage-j
firms decides to adjust their prices, so ηj,t = (1− αj,t) decides not to adjust. Then the
total fraction of adjusting firms is ω0,t =
∑J
=1 αj,t · θj,t, which charge new price at time t.
The fraction of firms maintaining the price set previously is ωj,t = (1 − αj,t) · θj,t. Then,
we have the law of motion for the firm distribution:
θ1,t+1 = ω0,t, (3.19)
θj+1,t+1 = ωj,t, for j = 1..J − 2. (3.20)
In other words, θ is the begin-period distribution, while ω is the end-period distribution
that will play as the weights for aggregation later.
At time t, a vintage-j firm must choose between changing its price that was set j
periods ago (P ∗j,t = P
∗
t−j) and keeping this price. Each j-vintage firm has a value function
in the form of Bellman equation:
V Fj,t = max{υ0,t − wt · ξt; υj,t}, (3.21)
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where
υj,t = pij,t + β · Et
(
λt+1
λt
· ηj+1,t+1 · υj+1,t+1
)
+ β · Et
(
λt+1
λt
· αj+1,t+1 · υ0,t+1
)
− β · Et
(
λt+1
λt
· αj+1,t+1 · wt+1 · ξt+1
)
, (3.22)
and
υ0,t = max
P ∗t

pi0,t(P
∗
t ; st) + β · Et
(
λt+1
λt
· η1,t+1 · υ1,t+1
)
+β · Et
(
λt+1
λt
· α1,t+1 · υ0,t
)
− β · Et
(
λt+1
λt
· α1,t+1 · wt+1 · ξt+1
)
 , (3.23)
where, υ0,t = υ0,t(P
∗
t ; st) is the value if the firm adjusts price, incurring adjustment cost
ξt in terms of labor, υj,t = υj,t(P
∗
t−j ; st) is the value if the firm does not adjust its price, st
is the state vector that governs the evolution of the firm's demand and costs, and λt+1/λt
is the ratio of future to current marginal utility. The real profit function of the firm (pi)
coming from its cost minimization and the demand curve given by the final goods producer
is:
pij,t =
[
P ∗j,t
Pt
− ψt
]
·
(
P ∗j,t
Pt
)−
· ct , where j = 0..J − 1 (3.24)
and
Pt =
J−1∑
j=0
ωt,j · (P ∗j,t)1−
 11− , (3.25)
Firms will adjust their prices if and only if the adjustment value after subtracting the
adjustment cost is greater than or equal to the non-adjustment value. Therefore, there
exists a threshold of adjustment cost, ξˆj,t, such that a firm of vintage-j will adjust its price
if it draws an adjustment cost less than this value. Therefore,
υ0,t − υj,t = ξˆj,t · wt. (3.26)
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Suppose that υj,t is a decreasing function in j, and that the adjustment cost ( ξ) are
drawn from an cumulative distribution G(·). Then the probability that a firm of vintage-j
is going to adjust its price is
αj,t = G(ξˆj,t) = G ([υ0,t − υj,t] /wt) . (3.27)
The expected labor cost used for the price adjustment for a firm of vintage j will be:
npj,t =
ξˆj,t∫
0
ξ · dG(ξ) or npjt =
αj,t∫
0
ξ(i) · di, (3.28)
and the total labor using for adjusting prices is:
npt =
J∑
j=1
θj,t · npj,t. (3.29)
Note that the optimal price P ∗t set by a typical firm will not be vintage-dependent
because all firms that change their prices at a given time chooses the same price. The firm
who adjusts chooses price P ∗t that satisfies the first-order condition:
0 =
∂pi0,t
∂P ∗t
+ β · Et
(
η1,t+1 · λt+1
λt
· ∂υ1,t+1
∂P ∗t
)
, (3.30)
where the real marginal values are in recursive forms:
∂υj,t
∂P ∗j,t
=
∂pij,t
∂P ∗j,t
+β ·Et
(
ηj+1,t+1 · λt+1
λt
· ∂υj+1,t+1
∂P ∗j+1,t+1
· ∂P
∗
j+1,t+1
∂P ∗j,t
)
for j = 1, ..., J−1, (3.31)
∂υJ−1,t
∂P ∗t−J+1
=
∂piJ−1,t
∂P ∗t−J+1
because ηJ = 0 as αJ = 1, (3.32)
and the real marginal profits are
∂pij,t
∂P ∗j,t
=
[
(1− ) ·
(
P ∗t−j
Pt
)−
· 1
Pt
+  · ψt ·
(
P ∗t−j
Pt
)−−1
· 1
Pt
]
· ct. (3.33)
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Substitute these recursive marginal values and marginal profit into the first-order con-
dition for adjusting prices will give us the following optimal pricing policy:
P ∗t =

− 1 ·
J−1∑
j=0
βjEt
{
(ωj,t+j/ω0,t) · (λt+j/λt) · ψt+j · P t+j · ct+j
}
J−1∑
j=0
βjEt
{
(ωj,t+j/ω0,t) · (λt+j/λt) · P −1t+j · ct+j
} , (3.34)
where ωj,t+j/ω0,t = ηj,t+j · ηj−1,t+j−1 · ... · η1,t+1 · 1 is the probability of non-adjustment
from t to t+ j.
It is clear from the optimal pricing equation that the firm adjusts its price based on
the expectation about future marginal costs, future price level, future aggregate demand,
time discount and the probability of not adjusting price due to the uncertainty about the
future adjustment costs. If the firm expects that it can not change its price and has to
keep the current price for a long time then it would set a higher price. Also, the higher
the future marginal cost, the higher the price the firm set. The higher future demand also
encourage firm to set higher price today in case it has to keep its current price for some
periods.
3.2.5 Money demand and supply
As in Dotsey et al. [1999], I assume the money demand is a slightly modified version of
quantity theory where Mdt = Ptct. However, I use different money supply specifications
as following:
4 lnMt = (1− ρ) · µ+ ρ · 4 lnMt−1 + εt, (3.35)
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and
Mt = M t + ut, (3.36)
M t = (1 + µ)
t ·M0
ut = ρ · ut−1 + t
where µ is money growth,  is monetary shock, ρ specifies the persistent of the shock.
The first specification means that the growth rate of money supply follows an AR(1)
process with mean µ and persistence ρ. In the second specification, the money supply level
follows an AR(1) process.
3.2.6 General equilibrium
In general equilibrium, the representative household chooses the sequence of {ct} to maxi-
mize the present value of life time utility assuming the fraction of total working time (Nt)
devoted for both production and price adjustment is 20%.
The the final goods producer chooses the sequence of {ct} by solving its zero profit
problem. Each intermediate firm in each vintage chooses sequences of {ni,t}, {ki,t} that
solve its cost minimization subject to the demand it faces.
The general equilibrium is also characterized by J vintages of firms. At time t, a firm
in each vintage-j has the optimal price P ∗ set j periods ago. Therefore, the set of prices
at time t is {P ∗t , P ∗1,t, .., P ∗J,t}. Further, the money market should be at equilibrium. Also
the markets for the final goods and for intermediate goods satisfy the clearing conditions.
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3.3 Steady state of the economy
3.3.1 Steady state characterization
At steady state (SS), the number of vintages are stable and equal to J . The relative price
distribution (or the relative distribution of firms), the probability of price adjustment for
each vintage, and the values of firm of J vintages should be stable or independent of time,
which means:
αj,t = αj,t+1 = αj for j = 1..J
ωj,t = ωj,t+1 = ωj for j = 0..J − 1 (3.37)
θj,t = θj,t+1 = θj for j = 1..J
There is only the growth of money that is µ . Therefore, Pt−1Pt = µ,
P ∗j,t
P ∗j+1,t
= µ,
P ∗t
Pt
=
P ∗t+1
Pt+1
=
P ∗
P , and other real variables do not change at SS, including λt+1 = λt = λ, ct+1 = ct = c,
yt+1 = yt = y.
The system of FOC equations from the representative HH problem gives us:
β =
1
1 + r
(3.38)
and λ = (c− κ · c)−σ − β · κ · (c− κ · c)−σ = χ ·N
φ
w
. (3.39)
A firm of vintage j has the optimal price P ∗j,t = µ
−j ·P ∗t . From the final goods producer
problem, we have:
Pt =
J−1∑
j=0
ωt,j · (P ∗j,t)1−
 11− ,
or
P
P ∗
=
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · (µ−j)1−
 11− , (3.40)
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and yj =
(
P ∗t−j
Pt
)−
· c =
(
µ−j · P ∗t
Pt
)−
· c = µj ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
· c. (3.41)
From the FOCs for the intermediate good producer, we have:
w = ψ · γ ·
[
µj ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
· c/nj
]
,
or nj = ψ · γ ·
[
µj ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
· c/w
]
, (3.42)
and q = ψ · (1− γ) · [yj/kj ] = ψ · (1− γ) · [nj/kj ]γ = ψ · (1− γ) · [n/k]γ ,
or k =
(
ψ
q
)1/γ
· (1− γ)1/γ · n, where q = r, (3.43)
n =
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · nj =
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · ψ · γ
[
µj ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
· c/w
]
. (3.44)
The sum of firm i's production, i ∈ [0, 1], will give us:
y =
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · yj =
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · µj ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
· c =
(
P ∗
P
)−
· c ·
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · µj,
or y/c =
(
P ∗
P
)− J−1∑
j=0
ωj · µj. (3.45)
The optimal pricing policy gives us:
P ∗t =

− 1 · ψ ·
J−1∑
j=1
βj · (ωj/ω0) · (µj · Pt)
J−1∑
j=1
βj · (ωj/ω0) · (µj · Pt)−1
,
or ψ =
− 1

· P
∗
P
·
J−1∑
j=0
βj · (ωj/ω0) · µj(−1)
J−1∑
j=0
βj · (ωj/ω0) · µj
. (3.46)
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From the stable distribution of firms, adjustment probability we have:
ω0 = [1 + η1 + η2 · η1 + ...+ (ηJ−1...η1)]−1, (3.47)
ωj = (1− αj) · θj for j = 1..J − 1,
θj = ωj−1 for j = 1..J − 1.
At steady state, the values of firms in J vintages are:
υJ−1 = piJ−1 + β · υ0 − β · w · npJ ,
υJ−2 = piJ−2 + β · ηJ−1 · υJ−1 + β · αJ−1 · υ0 − β · αJ−1 · w · npJ−1,
υJ−3 = piJ−3 + β · ηJ−2 · υJ−2 + β · αJ−2 · υ0 − β · αJ−2 · w · npJ−2, (3.48)
......
υ1 = pi1 + β · η2 · υ2 + β · α2 · υ0 − β · α2 · w · np2,
where pij = [
P ∗
P
· µ−j − ψ] ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
· µj · c, (3.49)
and npj =
αj∫
0
ξ(i) · di. (3.50)
Total cost of price adjustment is:
np =
J∑
j=1
θjn
p
j . (3.51)
Total labor for producing intermediate goods is n =
∑J−1
j=0 ωj · nj , from FOCs for the
intermediate good producers:
n = 0.2− np =
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · ψ · γ
[
µj ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
· c/w
]
,
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or w/c = (0.2− np)−1 · ψ · γ ·
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · µj ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
. (3.52)
After simplifying, we have J equations with J unknown (υ0/c, α1,α2,..., αJ−1) at steady
state:
υ0
c
=
pi0
c
+ β · η1 ·
(υ1
c
)
+ β · α1 ·
(υ0
c
)
− β · α1 ·
(w
c
)
· np1, (3.53)
(
υ0
c
− υj
c
)/
(w
c
)
= ξ(αj), (3.54)
where
υJ−1
c
=
piJ−1
c
+ β · υ0
c
− β · w
c
· npJ ,
υJ−2
c
=
piJ−2
c
+ β · ηJ−1 · υJ−1
c
+ β · αJ−1 · υ0
c
− β · αJ−1 · w
c
· npJ−1,
υJ−3
c
=
piJ−3
c
+ β · ηJ−2 · υJ−2
c
+ β · αJ−2 · υ0
c
− β · αJ−2 · w
c
· npJ−2, (3.55)
......
υ1
c
=
pi1
c
+ β · η2 · υ2
c
+ β · α2 · υ0
c
− β · α2 · w
c
· np2,
pij
c
=
(
P ∗
P
)−
·
[
P ∗
P
· µ−j − ψ
]
· µj, (3.56)
w/c = (0.2− np)−1 · ψ · γ ·
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · µj ·
(
P ∗
P
)−
, (3.57)
P
P ∗
=
J−1∑
j=0
ωj · (µ−j)1−
 11− , (3.58)
ψ =
− 1

· P
∗
P
·
J−1∑
j=0
βj · (ωj/ω0) · µj(−1)
J−1∑
j=0
βj · (ωj/ω0) · µj
, (3.59)
np =
J∑
j=1
θj · npj , (3.60)
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and npj =
αj∫
0
ξ(i) · di. (3.61)
Note that the cost of adjustment for firm i is the wage payments for the labor that
must be hired w · ξ(i). The function ξ(i) is assumed to be differentiable and satisfies the
following conditions:
ξ(0) = 0,
ξ
′
(i) > 0, i ∈ [0; 1], (3.62)
ξ(1) = B <∞,
where B is maximum adjustment cost. For simplicity in this paper I am going to use the
function in the original DKW paper. My future work will focus on beta functions. The
DKW paper uses the general form ξ(i) as follow:
ξ(i) =
B
Ω
· [arctan(b · i− d · pi) + arctan(d · pi)] , (3.63)
Ω = [arctan(b− d · pi) + arctan(d · pi)] . (3.64)
So, we have:
npj =
αj∫
0
ξ(i) · di. = B
b · Ω · [(b · αj − d · pi) · arctan(b · αj − d · pi) + d · pi · arctan(−d · pi)]
+
B
b · Ω ·
[
−1
2
· ln(1 + (b · αj − d · pi)2) + 1
2
· ln(1 + (d · pi)2)
]
+
B · arctan(d · pi)
Ω
· αj . (3.65)
3.3.2 Parameter calibration
The complete model parameters are listed in Table 3.1. The annual real interest rate is
chosen to be 5%, or the time discount factor is 0.9524 annually. The total labor supply
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Table 3.1: Benchmark parameters
Name Parameter Value Annualized
Real interest rate r 0.0123 0.05
Discount factor β 0.9879 0.9524
Faction of time endowment used for working N 0.2
Economy-wide productivity factor A 1
Demand elasticity (using markup of 33%) ε 4.33
Share of labor in production γ 2/3
Share of capital in production 1− γ 1/3
Labor supply elasticity φ−1 ∞
Inter-temporal elasticity of substitution σ 1
Steady state inflation µ 0.0123 0.05
Habit formation coefficient κ 0.6
Maximal adjustment cost B 0.0058
Parameter b in the adjustment cost function b 16
Parameter d in the adjustment cost function d 1
is fixed at 0.20 or 20% of total time endowment. To ensure the labor is fixed, the labor
supply is set at infinity. The other values are conventional except the habit formation
coefficient kappa. Choosing kappa is a bit controversial. Durham and Dale [1991] showed
that the habit formation coefficient in time series model is 0.849 on average. The kappa
in the work by Sommer [2007] is around 0.7. Constantinides [1990] and Jermann [1998]
use kappa of 0.8 and 0.82 respectively. In this paper, I chooses a moderate kappa of 0.6.
Also, I choose different values of kappa to analyze the sensitivity of the model's results
with respect to kappa.
3.3.3 Steady state results
I use a numerical method to solve for the steady state (SS) values at aggregate and
firm levels. Note from above that I have simplified the system of first-order equations
governing the general equilibrium at SS and obtained a simpler system of J equations
with J unknown (υ0/c, α1,α2,..., αJ−1). Solving the system numerically gives us the steady
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state results that are very similar to those in Dotsey et al. [1999]. The habit formation
does not effect the steady state values. The reason is that at the steady state, there is
no uncertainty, leading to equal real consumptions every period, and Permanent Income
Hypothesis should hold.
The probability of adjustment and distribution of firms
We can see from Figure 3.1 that the lower the inflation the longer the firms keep their
prices. With the inflation rate of 10%, the firms of vintage 5 will adjust their prices
with 100% probability, while if the inflation is 5%, all firms will adjust their prices after 7
quarters. Given inflation the longer the firm keeps their prices, the higher the probability
(αj) they adjust their prices, for example, given the inflation of 5%, a firm of vintage 5
adjusts its price with probability of around 20%, while a firm of vintage 7 are more likely
to adjust its price, with probability of 43%.
The distributions of firms are different under different inflation economies, see Figure
3.2. First, the fraction of firms with more recently adjusted prices is always larger than
those with old prices. If the inflation rate is 10%, more than 26% of firms charge new
prices every period, while 25% of firms charge a quarter-old price, and no firms keeps their
prices more than 5 quarters. If the inflation rate is 5%, there are about 18% of firms that
adjust their prices every period and no firms keep the prices more than 8 quarters.
Real profit
The Figure 3.3 shows the real profit of firms in each vintage under different economies.
It is interesting that the profit function is asymmetric over the maximal value. After
peaking the maximal points, the profits decreases rapidly. Therefore, firms would be
more sensitive to relative low price than relative high price compared with the optimal
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Figure 3.1: Probability of adjusting prices in each vintage
Figure 3.2: Beginning-period distribution of firms (θ)
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Figure 3.3: Profit functions
ones. From the profit function, we can see the forward-looking behavior of firms. They
always set their real prices higher than the optimal one. When time passes, the real price
is eroded by inflation and becomes smaller and closer to the profit-maximizing prices. For
example, in the 5% inflation economy, firms always set their prices in a way such that
after 2 periods the firms will obtain the maximal profit. Afterward, firms' profits decrease
drastically. However, firms never keep their prices too long to suffer a loss.
Real value
The Figure 3.4 shows the values of firms in each vintage based on the inflation of 5%.
Whenever a firm has an opportunity to adjust its price, it will choose the one that max-
imizes the present discounted real value. Therefore, the value at time 1 is corresponding
to the value of adjusting firms. The real value of a firm is decreasing in vintage j. It
is reasonable because the longer a firm keeps its price, the lower the value it is going to
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Figure 3.4: Value function when pi = 2.5%
receive, leading to higher probability of price adjustment.
3.4 Dynamics of output and inflation
3.4.1 Methodology
The system of first-order conditions governing the general equilibrium is linearized or log-
linearized around the steady state to obtain a stochastic singular linear difference system
in the form:
A · Et(Yt+1) = B · Yt +
H∑
h=0
Ch · Et(Xt+h), (3.66)
where Y is a vector of endogenous variables. In my model these endogenous variables
include log deviation of c, y, n, np, npj , P
∗
j , P,M, υ0, υj , pi0, pij , marginal values and profits
(mυ0,mυj ,mpi0,mpij) and deviations of αj , ωj , θj , ηj from the steady state values. X is
a vector of exogenous variables including the log-deviation of money level or deviation of
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monetary growth (and log-deviation of technology level or deviation of technology growth
from those of the steady state) and Ch are the coefficient matrices for the exogenous
variables.
Further, there are some predetermined endogenous variables in Y called Yp, which
can not respond immediately to unexpected changes in X. The rest of Y are non-
predetermined endogenous variables Yn.The predetermined endogenous variables and stochas-
tic exogenous variables make up the state variable St.
The exogenous variables are subject to unexpected change and can be specified in the
form:
Xt = Q · ςt, (3.67)
ςt = ρ · ςt−1 + G
	
· εt, (3.68)
where ρ is a matrix of coefficients for the autoregressive process and G
	
governs the response
of the exogenous variables to innovations of exogenous shocks εt.
The method by King and Watson (1998) is used to solve the the above singular linear
difference system. The solution can be cast in the following state space form: Ynt
Xt
 =
 ΠY Yp ΠY ς
0 Q

 Ypt
ςt
 , (3.69)
 Ypt
ςt
 =
 MYpYp ΠYpς
0 ρ

 Ypt−1
ςt−1
+
 0
G
	
 εt. (3.70)
Then the dynamics of output and inflation will be simulated under a monetary shock using
the above solution for the system of singular linear difference equations.
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3.4.2 Dynamics results
Figure 3.5 shows the dynamics of output, consumption, price level, real marginal cost
and fraction of firms adjusting prices under a permanent money supply shock for the
original DKW model (without habit formation or kappa=0) and for the model with habit
formation. In the original DKW model, output jump up at the time of the shock by about
0.45% and go back to the steady state after 4 quarters due to a monetary shock feeds into
the price level. In contrast, under the habit formation model with kappa of 0.6, effect of
monetary shock on output and price level is persistent. Only after about 12 quarters the
output comes back to the steady state.
It is also very interesting that in the habit formation model, output and consumption do
not jump up in response to the shock. Especially, the responses of output and consumption
are hump-shaped. The response of output peaks after 1 quarters and then decreases
gradually. The maximal output response in the habit formation model is only 0.3%,
which is much smaller than 0.45% in the DKW model.
Also the response of price level in the habit formation model is strikingly different
from that of the original DKW model. In the DKW model, the response of price level
is transient - it goes back to steady state after only 5 quarters - while the deviation of
price level in the habit model is quite persistent, going back the the steady state after
approximately 15 quarters.
It is also interesting that price level in DKW model jumps less than in the habit model.
The reason is that the impact response of fraction of adjusting firms in the habit model
is greater than the DKW model. This outcome results from the feature of the rational
expectation model. Firms know that consumers are wealthier due to sticky price but afraid
of the sudden increase in consumption due to habit formation, the firms will increase prices
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Figure 3.5: Impulse responses under a permanent shock to the money supply
Figure 3.6: Output responses under a permanent shock to the money supply
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without reducing the demand. In addition, because households change consumption little
by little, initiating a jump in the fraction of firms adjusting prices to clear the money
market.
Further, the behavior of firm price adjustment in the habit formation model looks
similar to that of the conventional TDP model after the first period of shock. On impact,
in the habit model 10% more firms charge new prices. Afterward, the fraction of firms
adjusting new prices are the same those at the steady state. In other words, their adjusting
behavior like in the TDP framework, where under any shock the fraction of firms adjusting
new prices are the same at the steady state. This is strikingly different from the dynamics
of price adjustment in the DKW model.
Figure 3.6 shows the responses of output using different values for habit formation
parameter, kappa. It is obvious that when the habit increases, the responses become more
persistent. In my model, the hump-shaped only appears when the habit coefficient reaches
a certain value of around 0.60.
The above results are robust to different innovations of monetary shock. Under a
persistent monetary supply shock, the responses of consumption and output, presented
in Figure 3.7 and 3.8, are much more persistent in the habit formation model. Also the
responses of price levels are very persistent. The output response in the habit formation
model is hump-shaped and is at peak of around 0.3% after one quarter, which is not found
in the original DKW model.
More interesting are the responses of output and price level in the DKW and habit
formation models under a persistent money growth shock, presented in Figure 3.9 and
3.10, because this type of shock seems to be empirically reasonable. We can see from the
figures that the output and consumption responses in the DKWmodel are complicated and
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Figure 3.7: Impulse responses under a persistent shock to the money supply
Figure 3.8: Output responses under a persistent shock to the money supply
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Figure 3.9: Impulse responses under a permanent shock to the money growth
largely fluctuated, while the responses from the habit formation are much more smoother.
Like under the persistent money supply shocks, with habit formation the output and
consumption are less jumpy, peak after 2 quarters and are very persistent.
Figure 3.10 shows the sensitivity of habit formation with different values of kappa.
The bigger the coefficient, the more persistent the responses of output and consumption.
The hump-shaped characteristic appears only when kappas reaches to a certain level about
0.40, lower than the case of persistent money supply shock.
3.5 Conclusion
The paper introduces habit formation or additive consumption, which is popularly used
in asset pricing, development economics and monetary economics, in the framework of
SDP. By introducing the habit formation, the utility function becomes time non-separable
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Figure 3.10: Output responses under a permanent shock to the money growth
rather than conventionally time separable. The utility depends not only on the current
consumption as in the time separable function but also on the exponentially weighted
past consumption. The habit formation makes consumers averse to a sudden and un-
sustainable change in consumption, reducing their aggressive behavior in consumption
or front-loading behavior under shocks, causing output, price level and other macroe-
conomic variables more persistent and hump-shaped, which could not be found in the
conventional SDP models.
The SDP model with habit formation produces the responses of output and price level
to monetary shock that are entirely different from those in the conventional SDP models.
With moderate habit formation (κ = 0.61), consumption and output are less jumpy at
the time of a monetary growth shock. The output initially increases by only 0.25%
compared to 0.45% in the conventional SDP model. The output peaks after 2 quarters
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before returning to the steady state after approximately 12 quarters. This persistent and
hump-shaped response can not be found in the conventional SDP model and other extant
SDP models.
In addition, the initial response of factions of firms adjusting their prices under habit
formation model is much higher than that in the original DKW model. At the time of
the shock, there is 10% more of firms adjusting their prices compared to about 7% in the
DKW model. The reason comes from the small initial adjustment in consumption due
to habit formation, initiating a larger fraction of firms adjusting their prices to clear the
money market. This causes initial response of price level to be much more higher in the
habit formation model though it is very persistent.
There are several ways to extend this model. Incorporating economy-wide or idiosyn-
cratic technology shocks would produce interesting results. Especially, by incorporating
idiosyncratic technology shocks, we can relate the results from the habit formation model
with technology shocks to those from the extant SDP models including Dotsey et al. [2006]
and Golosov and Lucas [2007].
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